Criminalizing China by Lewis, Margaret K.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
Volume 111 Issue 1 Article 3 
Spring 2021 
Criminalizing China 
Margaret K. Lewis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Margaret K. Lewis, Criminalizing China, 111 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 145 (2021). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of 
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
0091-4169/21/11101-0145 
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 111, No. 1 
Copyright © 2021 by Margaret K. Lewis Printed in U.S.A. 
145 
CRIMINALIZING CHINA 
MARGARET K. LEWIS∗ 
The Department of Justice launched the China Initiative in November 
2018 to counter national security threats emanating from the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). By June 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
had approximately two thousand active investigations under the Initiative. 
People and entities with connections to the PRC’s governing party-state 
structure have engaged in trade secret theft and other crimes under U.S. law. 
The Department of Justice is not making up a threat. It is, however, framing 
that threat in a problematic way. 
This Article argues that using “China” as the glue connecting cases 
prosecuted under the Initiative’s umbrella creates an overinclusive 
conception of the threat and attaches a criminal taint to entities that possess 
“China-ness,” based on PRC nationality, PRC national origin, Chinese 
ethnicity, or other expressions of connections with “China.” The Article 
further contends that, when assessed in light of the goals of deterrence, 
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution, it is worrisome that the 
prosecution and punishment of people and entities rests in part on a 
connection with “China.” A better path is to discard the “China Initiative” 
framing, focus on cases’ individual characteristics, and enhance the 
Department of Justice’s interactions with nongovernmental experts. 
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On November 1, 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions launched the 
China Initiative: “Chinese economic espionage against the United States has 
been increasing—and it has been increasing rapidly. Enough is enough. 
We’re not going to take it anymore.”1 In October 2020, the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) released an updated information sheet with dozens of examples 
of “China-related” cases since April 2018.2 More cases are in the pipeline. In 
June 2020, Christopher Wray, the director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), said that there were “more than 2,000 active 
investigations that link back to the Chinese government.”3 This is a marked 
increase from Director Wray’s statement in February 2020 that there were 
“about a thousand investigations involving China’s attempted theft of U.S.-
 
 1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF SESSION’S CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET 
(2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1107256/download [https://perma.cc/42VB-
GWXD] [hereinafter CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET]. 
 2 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S CHINA 
INITIATIVE AND A COMPILATION OF CHINA-RELATED PROSECUTIONS SINCE 2018 (2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1223496/download [https://perma.cc/GC8E-DQEX]. 
 3 Ursula Perano, Wray: FBI Has Over 2,000 Investigations that Trace Back to China, 
AXIOS (June 24, 2020), https://www.axios.com/fbi-wray-china-counterintelligence-
investigations-f809b7df-865a-482b-9af4-b1410c0d3b49.html [https://perma.cc/2TVJ-
AMWN]. 
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based technology in all fifty-six of our field offices and spanning just about 
every industry and sector.”4 
There is overwhelming evidence that persons—both natural and legal—
with connections to the governing party-state structure of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) have engaged in trade secret theft and other crimes 
under U.S. law.5 There is also clear evidence that the PRC government and 
intertwined Chinese Communist Party (CCP, and the collective ruling entity 
best termed the PRC party-state) are incentivizing and even recruiting people 
at home and abroad to acquire intellectual property in contravention of U.S. 
laws.6 The July 2020 closure of the PRC consulate in Houston underscored 
intellectual property as a national security concern: the Trump 
administration’s stated reason was “to protect American intellectual property 
and [Americans’] private information.”7 In short, the DOJ is not making up 
 
 4 Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Opening Remarks at the China 
Initiative Conference at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (Feb. 6, 2020) 
(transcript available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/fbi-director-christopher-wrays-opening-
remarks-china-initiative-conference [https://perma.cc/2AA3-E9TY]); see also William Barr, 
U.S. Att’y Gen., Keynote Address at the China Initiative Conference at CSIS (Feb. 6, 2020) 
(transcript available at https://www.csis.org/events/china-initiative-conference 
[https://perma.cc/2VTX-K5YP]) (noting in context of China Initiative that “you should expect 
more indictments and prosecutions in the future”); The Latest: FBI Chief Wray Says China 
Poses a Serious Threat, AP (July 23, 2019, 11:10 am), https://www.usnews.com/news/
politics/articles/2019-07-23/the-latest-fbi-chief-wray-says-china-poses-a-serious-threat 
[https://perma.cc/66NK-PTUU] (“Wray told the Senate Judiciary Committee on Tuesday the 
FBI has more than 1,000 investigations involving economic espionage and attempted 
intellectual property theft. He says nearly all lead back to China.”). 
 5 See, e.g., WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., U.S.-CHINA TRADE ISSUES, 
IF10030 (2019) (“In October 2018, Crowdstrike, a U.S. cybersecurity technology company, 
identified China as ‘the most prolific nation-state threat actor during the first half of 2018.’”). 
 6 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Robert D. Williams, The Chinese Hacking Indictments and 
the Frail “Norm” Against Commercial Espionage, LAWFARE (Nov. 30, 2017, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinese-hacking-indictments-and-frail-norm-against-
commercial-espionage [https://perma.cc/CSL5-GY8M]. 
 7 Timeline: The Unraveling of U.S. China Relations, NPR (July 22, 2020, 3:58 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/893767828 [https://perma.cc/3NM5-NQ65]; Michael R. 
Pompeo, Sec’y of State, Communist China and the Free World’s Future, Speech at the Richard 
Nixon Presidential Library and Museum (July 23, 2020) (transcript available at 
https://www.state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future/ [https://perma.cc/8JTY-
XY73]) (announcing PRC consulate closing “because it was a hub of spying and intellectual 
property theft.”). But see Mark Cohen, The IP Theft Nexus in the Houston Consulate Closing, 
CHINA IPR (July 22, 2020), https://chinaipr.com/2020/07/22/the-ip-theft-nexus-in-the-
houston-consulate-closing/ [https://perma.cc/HR6N-SJSV] (questioning whether “an 
economic espionage matter were really the motivation for this sudden evacuation of the 
consulate and not election-year politics”). 
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a threat.8 However, it is framing that threat in a problematic way. It is 
constructing a criminal justice initiative under the umbrella of “China” and 
criminalizing that concept in a way that is in tension with foundational 
principles of the United States’ criminal justice system. 
China is itself of course not a defendant in any cases.9 Federal 
prosecutors—supported by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies10—
must prove each element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt 
against the specific person accused of criminal conduct. Because the 
Initiative’s framing does not alter that ultimate standard for conviction, some 
may argue that the label “China Initiative” is mere branding to heighten 
awareness,11 or that creation of this project is simply a savvy move to obtain 
greater financial resources.12 This Article argues that the use of “China” is 
far more meaningful. It permeates into the cases and connects those cases 
into a larger whole. Although China is not the subject of criminal conviction 
 
 8 See, e.g., OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S 
ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 154 (2018), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/X252-
DSJK] (“[E]vidence indicates that China continues its policy and practice . . . of using cyber 
intrusions to target U.S. firms to access their sensitive commercial information and trade 
secrets.”). 
 9 Cf. Adam Hickey, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at the China Initiative 
Conference at the Ctr. for Strategic and Int’l Stud., at 51:07 (Feb. 6, 2020), (video available at 
https://www.csis.org/events/china-initiative-conference [https://perma.cc/2VTX-K5YP]) 
(“[T]he China Initiative is targeting the behavior of a foreign state. Behavior that writ large 
poses a strategic threat to the United States. Individual cases are based on individual behavior. 
We begin with what someone does, and from there a criminal investigation starts.”). 
 10 The FBI “is the principal investigative arm of the [DOJ] and a full member of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community.” What is the FBI?, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.
fbi.gov/about/faqs/what-is-the-fbi [https://perma.cc/23QL-LSMT] (last visited May 10, 
2020). It is not, however, the only investigative arm of the DOJ (e.g., Drug Enforcement 
Administration). See Organizational Chart, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart [https://perma.cc/FLB7-HT3C]. 
 11 Cf. Jeffrey Mervis, U.S. Prosecutor Leading China Probe Explains Effort that Led to 
Charges Against Harvard Chemist, SCIENCE (Feb. 3, 2020, 11:45 AM), https://www.science
mag.org/news/2020/02/us-prosecutor-leading-china-probe-explains-effort-led-charges-
against-harvard-chemist [https://perma.cc/3TUQ-DFLP] (“[Y]ou want a little bit of fear out 
there to sensitize people to the magnitude of the problem.”). 
 12 Cf. CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 1 (quoting Attorney General Sessions as 
stating: “This Initiative will identify priority Chinese trade theft cases [and] ensure that we 
have enough resources dedicated to them . . . .”); China’s Non-Traditional Espionage Against 
the United States: The Threat and Potential Policy Responses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 1 (2018) (statement of John C. Demers, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Nat’l Sec. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just.) (“[T]he former Attorney General announced an initiative 
to marshal our resources to better address [China’s economic aggression].”) [hereinafter 
Statement of Demers]. 
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and punishment directly, not only does the Initiative’s framing cause China-
ness to become imprinted as a shared characteristic across cases, but also the 
language anthropomorphizes China into a condemned form: “If you are an 
American adult, it is more likely than not that China has stolen your personal 
data.”13 
Nor do interspersed assurances that the Initiative is not targeted at 
“Chinese” people provide an effective antidote to this framing.14 The 
overarching narrative of a China threat undercuts such assurances. For 
instance, FBI Director Wray stated in February 2020:  
Confronting this threat effectively does not mean we shouldn’t do business 
with the Chinese. It does not mean we shouldn’t host Chinese visitors. It 
does not mean we shouldn’t welcome Chinese students or coexist with 
China on the world stage. But it does mean that when China violates our 
criminal laws and international norms, we are not going to tolerate it, much 
less enable it. 15 
There are times when the shorthand “China” is appropriate, such as 
when discussing foreign affairs between the United States and the PRC acting 
as sovereign states. For example, the two countries’ governments concluded 
a trade agreement titled the “U.S.-China Phase One Trade Agreement.”16 
Criminal law, in contrast, is based on the premise that guilt is individual, not 
by association with an entity—China—that does not exist in a form that the 
government can directly prosecute. Yet, the government discusses China as 
if it is a perpetrator. John Demers, Assistant Attorney General in the National 
Security Division and chair of the China Initiative steering group, said at the 
Initiative’s launch that, “[w]ith the Attorney General [Session’s] initiative, 
we will confront China’s malign behaviors and encourage them to conduct 
themselves as they aspire to be: one of the world’s leading nations.”17 In 
 
 13 Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the Hudson Institute’s 
Video Event on China’s Attempt to Influence U.S. Institutions (July 7, 2020) (transcript 
available at https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government
-and-the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-security-of-the-united-
states [https://perma.cc/U34G-EXFF]) (emphasis added). 
 14 See, e.g., id. (“This is not about the Chinese people, and it’s certainly not about Chinese 
Americans.”). 
 15 Id. 
 16 President Donald J. Trump, Remarks at Signing of the U.S.-China Phase One Trade 
Agreement (Jan. 15, 2020) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-u-s-china-phase-one-trade-agreement-2/ 
[https://perma.cc/MRH6-732A]). 
 17 CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 1 (emphasis added). See also Statement of 
Demers, supra note 12, at 2 (“China is instead pursuing its goals through malign behaviors 
that exploit features of a free-market economy and an open society like ours.”). 
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February 2020, Attorney General William Barr noted that the DOJ “launched 
its China Initiative to confront China’s maligned behaviors and to protect 
U.S. technology.”18 
Although this Article is focused on criminal law, the China Initiative is 
not just about criminal law.19 The DOJ has stressed that “[c]riminal charges 
are only one of our tools.”20 For example, the Initiative includes working 
with the Department of the Treasury to develop regulations.21 More 
generally, the Trump administration emphasized a “whole of government 
effort” to confront the PRC.22 This Article went to press shortly after the 
United States elected Joe Biden, at which point it was unclear what aspects 
of the China Initiative—and U.S.–China policy more generally—his 
administration would change. 
A “whole of government effort” should not lose sight of the distinct 
roles of different parts of the government. Policies that might fit more 
comfortably within the State Department, National Security Council, or other 
segments of the executive branch can raise concerns when transplanted into 
the world of individual criminal prosecutions. The China Initiative emanates 
from the DOJ,23 and core to the Initiative’s goals is using criminal law to 
 
 18 Barr, supra note 4 (emphasis added). 
 19 See, e.g., Wray, supra note 4 (“We’ve got a whole host of tools we can use, from 
criminal charges and civil injunctions to things like economic sanctions, entity listings, visa 
revocations.”). 
 20 The Department of Justice Responds to Economic Aggression and Other National 
Security Threats from the Chinese Government (Nov. 18, 2019) (presentation) (on file with 
author). 
 21 See CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 1; see also Alan Rappeport, U.S. Says 
China Is No Longer a Currency Manipulator, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/13/us/politics/treasury-china-currency-manipulator-
trade.html [https://perma.cc/8HUY-WXFR] (reporting decision to reverse course on 
designating the PRC as a currency manipulator while still pressing forward with regulations 
“scrutiniz[ing] foreign investment that were devised with China in mind”). 
 22 See, e.g., Christopher Ashley Ford, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Int’l Sec. and 
Nonproliferation, Remarks at the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Conference on 
Great Power Competition (Sept. 11, 2019) (transcript available at https://www.state.gov/
bureaucracy-and-counterstrategy-meeting-the-china-challenge/ [https://perma.cc/2LN7-LM7
Q]) (statement by Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, 
that “[w]e are working to break down traditional institutional stovepipes to confront Beijing’s 
whole-of-system strategy with a broad and coordinated response of our own.”). 
 23 CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 1 (“The Attorney General’s Initiative reflects 
the Department’s strategic priority of countering Chinese national security threats . . . .”). 
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combat a “China” threat.24 It is important to ask how the Initiative reflects 
the standard principles of criminal liability and justifications for punishment. 
The DOJ has articulated considerations that apply any time a decision 
is being made whether to prosecute, including the nature and seriousness of 
the offense, the deterrent effect of prosecution, and the person’s culpability 
in connection with the offense.25 This combination of utilitarian (e.g., 
deterrence) and retributive (e.g., blameworthiness) considerations carries 
through to the sentencing stage if a prosecution leads to a conviction. Federal 
judges are tasked with crafting a sentence that reflects four primary purposes: 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.26 Particularly 
because the DOJ itself decided to amalgamate dozens (and counting) of 
prosecutions as reflecting a common threat, an important question that has 
not been asked—or at least not publicly debated—is how the “China 
Initiative” framing interacts with these basic principles. This Article posits 
that the “China Initiative” construct is problematic when viewed from the 
perspective of these criminal law principles that undergird the DOJ’s work, 
and the implementation of the Initiative has borne out these concerns. 
The DOJ’s Justice Manual sets forth not only principles that should 
guide decisions to prosecute but also considerations that are impermissible, 
including a person’s ethnicity and national origin.27 This Article does not 
claim that the DOJ is intentionally prosecuting people because of their 
ethnicity, national origin, or both. But it does argue that the DOJ’s initiative 
against “China,” at a minimum, undermines the spirit of nondiscrimination 
that the Justice Manual extols. There are also other concerns about the China 
Initiative, such as how it might run afoul of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee 
of equal protection in the context of people’s ability to enter and remain in 
the United States.28 But this Article’s focus is on how the U.S. government 
 
 24 See Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 8 (explaining when describing the China 
Initiative that “[i]nvestigating and prosecuting economic espionage and other federal crimes 
will remain at the heart of our work.”). 
 25 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-27.230 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/
jm/justice-manual [https://perma.cc/EE9B-6N74]. 
 26 U.S. SENTENCING COMM., FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 4 (2020), 
https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/primers/federal-sentencing-basics [https://perma.cc/C2PD-
TTZK] (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 
 27 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 25, at § 9-27.260 (2018). 
 28 Cf. Emily Feng, Visas are the Newest Weapon in U.S.-China Rivalry, NPR (Apr. 25, 
2019, 5:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/25/716032871/visas-are-the-newest-weapon-
in-u-s-china-rivalry [https://perma.cc/F74Z-34V5] (highlighting the adoption of more 
restrictive U.S. visa policies affecting Chinese citizens). The China Initiative itself has not 
included travel bans, though the Trump administration has enacted strict limits in other 
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enforces criminal laws. It calls for a country-neutral framing of DOJ 
initiatives and, when a case does have a nexus to the PRC, greater precision 
in how the DOJ addresses that connection. One of the DOJ’s goals is to 
“reinforce the trust that leads to cooperation with law enforcement,”29 yet the 
current framing instead undermines trust. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief historical backdrop of ways that 
China played into the DOJ’s criminal cases prior to 2018. Part II introduces 
the design and implementation of the China Initiative. Part III analyzes how 
“China” is portrayed in the China Initiative context and argues that the term 
lacks clear boundaries: it conflates ideas of government, party, nationality, 
national origin, and ethnicity and melds them into an amorphous threat. 
Under the banner of the China Initiative, not only has “China” taken on a 
criminal taint, but people—both natural and legal—who are viewed as 
possessing some level of China-ness are likewise stigmatized. The United 
States’ criminal justice system does not allow guilt by association.30 But the 
China Initiative has created threat by association. 
Part IV applies the lens of criminal law theory to the DOJ’s emphasis 
on “China” as integral to this group of cases. It takes questions usually 
focused on individual defendants (e.g., how might prosecuting this person 
deter potential criminal conduct?) and also asks them of the China Initiative 
as a whole (e.g., how might the China Initiative deter potential criminal 
conduct?). This is an unorthodox mode of critique, but it is a useful exercise 
 
contexts. See, e.g., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Travelers Prohibited 
from Entry into the United States, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/from
-other-countries.html [https://perma.cc/MGV7-FTH5] (last visited May 11, 2020) (“CDC is 
working with public health partners to implement travel procedures announced in several 
Presidential proclamations on novel coronavirus.”); Alex M. Azar, II, Sec’y, Health and 
Human Serv., Remarks on Declaration of Public Health Emergency for 2019 Novel 
Coronavirus (Jan. 31, 2020) (transcript available at https://www.hhs.gov/about/lead
ership/secretary/speeches/2020-speeches/secretary-azar-delivers-remarks-on-declaration-of-
public-health-emergency-2019-novel-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/76JG-VGRU]) 
(“[T]he President has signed a Presidential Proclamation . . . temporarily suspending the entry 
into the United States of foreign nationals who pose a risk of transmitting the 2019 novel 
coronavirus.”); Ruthann Robson, Constitutionality of President’s “Muslim Ban”: Equal 
Protection Issues, CONST. L. PROF BLOG (Jan. 28, 2017), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com
/conlaw/2017/01/constitutionality-of-presidents-muslim-ban-equal-protection-issues.html 
[https://perma.cc/2D69-PHXB]; see also Alexandra Yoon-Hendricks, Visa Restrictions for 
Chinese Students Alarm Academia, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/07/25/us/politics/visa-restrictions-chinese-students.html [https://perma.cc/58BV-
325R] (discussing June 2018 decision of the Trump administration to require annual visa 
renewals as compared with the prior policy of five-year student visas). 
 29 Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 8. 
 30 See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224 (1961) (“In our jurisprudence guilt 
is personal . . . .”). 
2021] CRIMINALIZING CHINA 153 
in trying to identify why, and even if, the “China Initiative” is a helpful 
construct. Part IV warns that, when assessed in light of the goals of 
deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution, it is worrisome that 
the prosecution and punishment of people and entities rests in part on a 
connection with “China.” 
A better path is to discard the “China Initiative” framing, focus on cases’ 
individual characteristics, and enhance the DOJ’s interactions with 
nongovernmental experts. This approach does not mean building walls such 
that discussions cannot extend across cases. It does mean adopting a country-
neutral framing and only connecting cases when there is a compelling reason 
to do so, not because they have been categorized as part of a larger China 
threat. It also means creating a more robust conversation with academia and 
the private sector than the initial outreach that is underway.31 The U.S. 
government can and should do a better job of working with nongovernmental 
actors to reconcile two real phenomena: the threat by association attaching to 
people who possess China-ness and the threats from the PRC party-state that 
go far beyond traditional spying.32 FBI Director Wray has emphasized that 
what “we need to understand about the threat from China is just how diverse 
and multilayered it is.”33 A multilayered threat requires a multilayered 
understanding, which in turn would be better achieved by drawing on the 
well of deep expertise on the PRC that exists outside of the DOJ. 
 
 
 31 See Erin Nealy Cox, U.S. Att’y for the N. Dist. of Tex., Remarks at the China Initiative 
Conference at the Ctr. for Strategic and Int’l Stud., 01:08:08 (Feb. 6, 2020) (video available 
at https://www.csis.org/events/china-initiative-conference [https://perma.cc/2VTX-K5YP]) 
(“[W]e have been partnering with academic institutions and universities as well as corporate 
America . . . .”); Dr. Mary Sue Coleman, President of the Am. Ass’n of Univ., Remarks at the 
China Initiative Conference at the Ctr. for Strategic and Int’l Stud., 03:19:15 (Feb. 6, 2020) 
(video available at https://www.csis.org/events/china-initiative-conference [https://perma.cc
/2VTX-K5YP]) (noting appreciation for the working relationship that universities are 
developing with the FBI). 
 32 See Jie Dalei, Amy E. Gadsden, Mary Gallagher, Shen Kui, Margaret Lewis, Neysun 
A. Mahboubi, Peidong Sun, Rory Truex & Taisu Zhang, Is There a Future for Values-Based 
Engagement With China?, CHINAFILE (July 21, 2020), https://www.chinafile.com/conver
sation/there-future-values-based-engagement-china [https://perma.cc/XK88-J2EQ]. 
 33 Wray, supra note 4; see also Catherine Lutz, FBI Director Christopher Wray Wants to 
Talk About More than Russia, ASPEN INSTITUTE (July 20, 2018), https://www.aspeninstitute.
org/blog-posts/fbi-director-christopher-wray-wants-talk-about-more-than-russia/ 
[https://perma.cc/GU4X-Q68Y] (“China from a counterintelligence perspective represents the 
broadest, most challenging threat we face at this time . . . because with them it’s a whole state 
effort.”). 
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I. INTERACTIONS BEFORE THE INITIATIVE 
Criminal cases that somehow have a connection with the government, 
people, or place of the PRC are not new to the DOJ.34 But, until recently, 
these cases were largely treated as targeted areas of cooperation—or 
contention—rather than as confrontation with an existential threat.35 In 2008, 
a Nevada federal court convicted four PRC nationals for their participation 
in a money laundering conspiracy, visa fraud, and other charges related to a 
scheme that allegedly siphoned hundreds of millions of dollars from the Bank 
of China.36 That case stood out for the coordination between U.S. and PRC 
authorities, with one of the defendants voluntarily returning to the PRC and 
agreeing to be deposed via videoconference.37 The 2001 Mutual Legal 
Assistance Agreement38 between the United States and PRC facilitated this 
cooperation.39 A U.S. prosecutor who worked on the case recalled, “[t]he 
history of U.S.-China cooperation is short.”40 The Bank of China case was a 
high-water mark for that cooperation. 
Other cases have been more contentious. In 1996, a shipment of heroin 
from the PRC, hidden in the cavities of dead goldfish, led to a political row 
when a U.S. federal judge enjoined the removal of a witness to the PRC 
 
 34 See Loren M. Scolaro, Note, The Past, Present, and Future of United States-China 
Mutual Legal Assistance, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1688, 1693 (2019) (“The first joint investigation 
and prosecution between the United States and China occurred in the late 1980s and early 
1990s . . . .”). 
 35 Cf. Eric Tucker, US Officials Warn Chinese Espionage an ‘Existential Threat’, AP 
(Feb. 6, 2020, 10:35 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/us-officials-warn-chinese-
espionage-an-existential-threat-2020-2 [https://perma.cc/T7K8-TTL6] (quoting William 
Evanina, then nominee to be director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, 
as stating regarding Chinese economic espionage that “[t]he long-term existential threat to the 
security of our nation is real.”). 
 36 See United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 37 See Margaret K. Lewis, Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition: Human Rights 
Implications, 2 CHINA RTS. F. 83, 86–87 (2007). 
 38 See Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, China-U.S., June 19, 
2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13,102 (entered into force on Mar. 8, 2001). 
 39 For discussions of the Bank of China case see, e.g., Scolaro, supra note 34, at 1700–01; 
Eleanor Ross, Note, Increasing United States-China Cooperation on Anti-Corruption: 
Reforming Mutual Legal Assistance, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 839, 853 (2018); Matthew 
Bloom, Note, A Comparative Analysis of the United States’s Response to Extradition Requests 
from China, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 177, 201–02 (2008). 
 40 A Personal History of U.S.-China Law Enforcement Cooperation, COLUM. L. SCH. (Oct. 
12, 2015), https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/personal-history-us-china-law-
enforcement-cooperation [https://perma.cc/9PBN-WSPV] (quoting Ronald Cheng). 
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because of the potential that he would face torture or execution.41 Fast-
forwarding to 2018, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission found that “China remains the largest source of illicit fentanyl 
and fentanyl-like substances in the United States.”42 In 2017, federal 
prosecutors charged two PRC nationals for “conspiracies to distribute large 
quantities of fentanyl and fentanyl analogues and other opiate substances in 
the United States.”43 PRC-sourced fentanyl remains a point of tension in the 
U.S.–PRC relationship.44 
It is also not new to use criminal laws to combat intellectual property 
infringements involving the PRC. A low-tech example of intellectual 
property infringement in the early 1990s involved 100,000 pairs of 
unauthorized KEDS sneakers that were produced by Stride Rite’s former 
licensee in the PRC and then imported into the United States as genuine 
KEDS.45 Similarly, in United States v. DeFreitas, the defendant imported 
 
 41 See Wang v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808, 813 (9th Cir. 1996) (“To remedy the due process 
violations and to protect Wang from future torture, the court entered a permanent injunction 
barring the United States from removing Wang or returning him to China . . . . We affirm.”); 
see also William W. Tanner, The Case of Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno: The International 
Implications of Prosecutorial Misconduct, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 155 (1994) (analyzing 
the case and its impact on U.S.-PRC relations). 
 42 SEAN O’CONNOR, U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM’N, FENTANYL FLOWS FROM 
CHINA: AN UPDATE SINCE 2017 (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/Research/Fentanyl%20Flows%20from%20China.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4LP-
F3PJ]. 
 43 Justice Department Announces First Ever Indictments Against Designated Chinese 
Manufacturers of Deadly Fentanyl and Other Opiate Substances, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 
17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-first-ever-indictme
nts-against-designated-chinese-manufacturers [https://perma.cc/4TA6-CRZM]; see also 
Three Chinese Nationals Using the Alias “Alex” Indicted in the United States for Conspiring 
to Import and Distribute Deadly Opioids U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/three-chinese-nationals-using-alias-alex-indicted-
united-states-conspiring-import-and [https://perma.cc/L8NB-WU2Z]. 
 44 See, e.g., DEA Acting Administrator Uttam Dhillon’s Visit to Beijing, U.S. DRUG ENF’T 
ADMIN. (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2020/01/17/dea-acting-
administrator-uttam-dhillons-visit-beijing [https://perma.cc/V3UL-SC7H] (“U.S.-China 
counternarcotics cooperation was a common theme throughout all of the bi-lateral 
meetings.”); GEORGE SERLETIS, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, DEADLY HIGH-PURITY FENTANYL 
FROM CHINA IS ENTERING THE U.S. THROUGH E-COMMERCE CHANNELS (2019), 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/executive_briefings/ebot_george_serletis_fentanyl_f
rom_china_pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/FR3C-PT76] (“The fentanyl epidemic is regarded as a 
significant national security threat, and the issue is being raised in U.S.-China trade 
negotiations.”). 
 45 United States v. Bohai Trading Co., 45 F.3d 577, 578–80 (1st Cir. 1995). 
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from the PRC counterfeit Beanie Babies,46 then a widely popular toy.47 As a 
slightly higher tech example, in 2005, the PRC imprisoned two U.S. citizens 
for selling pirated DVDs in a case that was hailed as “a rare success in joint 
efforts by the United States and China to enforce intellectual property 
laws.”48 It is, admittedly, neither new nor surprising to have intellectual 
property theft accompany a country’s economic development.49 
Nor is economic espionage new. Congress enacted the Economic 
Espionage Act in 1996,50 though in the first five years there were only eleven 
prosecutions using the Act.51 At the time of the Act’s passage, the United 
States was ending a period in which it viewed Japan as its major economic 
rival in Asia.52 The PRC had not joined the World Trade Organization 
 
 46 COMPUT. CRIMES & INTELL. PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROSECUTING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES 129 (4th ed. 2013) (citing United States v. DeFreitas, 92 F. 
Supp. 2d 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). 
 47 Cf. ANDREW MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 1 (2005) (retelling how, in 1998, “United States Trade Representative 
Charlene Barshefsky was stopped by the U.S. Customs Service; her bags were found to 
contain forty-odd counterfeit ‘Beanie Babies’ (a highly popular stuffed toy at the time) she 
had purchased in Beijing.”). 
 48 2 Americans Sentenced in DVD Piracy in China, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2005), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/20/business/media/2-americans-sentenced-in-dvd-piracy-
in-china.html [https://perma.cc/3MGR-W5VH]. 
 49 See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Fake It Till You Make It: The Good News 
About China’s Knockoff Economy, FOREIGN AFF., July–Aug. 2013, at 25, 29, available 
at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2013-06-11/fake-it-till-you-make-it (“When 
the United States was just beginning its rise to wealth and power, it was every bit as much a 
pirate nation as China is today. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the United Kingdom 
was the primary target of thieving Americans, who focused their economic espionage on the 
British textile industry.”); see generally Margaret K. Lewis, Criminal Law Pays: Penal Law’s 
Contribution to China’s Economic Development, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 371, 427–
35 (2014) (discussing the role of criminalizing intellectual property theft in economic 
development). 
 50 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2018). 
 51 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Orly Lobel, Economic Espionage as Reality or Rhetoric: 
Equating Trade Secrecy with National Security, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 421 (2016). 
 52 See John Hemmings & James Amedeo, Lessons from the America-Japan Trade War of 
the 1980s, NAT’L INTEREST (July 2, 2018), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/lessons-
america-japan-trade-war-1980s-24882 [https://perma.cc/8MSN-TUC2]. 
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(WTO),53 and it was not yet an economic powerhouse.54 But this began to 
change rapidly in the aughts. Intellectual property concerns expanded beyond 
the then open-air Silk Alley in Beijing to the high-tech world of Silicon 
Valley. In 2001, police arrested two people trying to board a flight to the PRC 
with trade secrets from several Bay Area companies.55 They later pleaded 
guilty to economic espionage.56 
Key to economic espionage is that each time the government prosecutes 
under this provision it is deciding that the alleged theft of trade secrets is not 
just a civil concern for the company claiming theft. Rather, it is a wrong with 
broader societal implications that should be addressed via criminal law.57 A 
prosecution for economic espionage is also a statement that the theft rises to 
the level of harming national security. In contrast to traditional espionage of 
government secrets,58 economic espionage—sometimes termed industrial 
espionage—expands the range of protection to the private sphere.59 
There are critics of casting this wider net of criminal liability,60 
especially as economic espionage created a powerful tool for federal 
 
 53 See generally Donald C. Clarke, China’s Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for 
Compliance, 2 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 97 (2003) (discussing the PRC’s accession in 
2001); BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH 389 (2007) 
(noting that PRC applied to rejoin the GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, the 
predecessor of the WTO) in 1986). 
 54 See WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S ECONOMIC RISE: 
HISTORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1 (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q878-TKXZ] (detailing how the 
PRC’s emergence “as a major economic power has raised concern among many U.S. policy 
makers”). 
 55 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Two Men Plead Guilty to Stealing Trade Secrets 
from Silicon Valley Companies to Benefit China (Dec. 14, 2006), https://www.justice.
gov/archive/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2006/yePlea.htm [https://perma.cc/R35L-
6WPA]. 
 56 Id.; COMPUT. CRIMES & INTELL. PROP. SECTION, supra note 46, at 209; see also United 
States v. Ye, 436 F.3d 1117, 1119, 1119 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing arrest when boarding 
flight to China and charges for stealing trade secrets). 
 57 See generally Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual 
Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 469 (2011) (proposing an analytical and 
normative framework to understand criminal sanctions for IP theft). 
 58 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–799 (2018). 
 59 See, e.g., NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE & SEC. CTR., FOREIGN ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 
IN CYBERSPACE 2 (2018), https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/news/20180724-
economic-espionage-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QCL-437L] (“Economic or Industrial 
Espionage means (a) stealing a trade secret . . . .”). 
 60 See Nicola Searle, The Criminalization of the Theft of Trade Secrets: An Analysis of the 
Economic Espionage Act, 2 IP THEORY 33, 41–42 (2012) (discussing debate on merits of 
criminalizing trade secret theft). 
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prosecutors.61 The DOJ’s addition of a National Security Division in 2006 
enhanced the infrastructure for prosecuting economic espionage.62 Within 
the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division, the Economic Espionage Unit serves 
as a “specialized unit focused solely on prosecuting cases under the 
Economic Espionage Act.”63 
A conviction for economic espionage under 18 U.S.C. § 1831 requires 
prosecutors to prove that there is a nexus to a foreign government: 
[T]he second mens rea requirement is that the defendant intended or knew that the 
offense would “benefit” a “foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign 
agent.” . . . A “foreign instrumentality” is “any agency, bureau, ministry, component, 
institution, association, or any legal, commercial, or business organization, corporation, 
firm, or entity that is substantially owned, controlled, sponsored, commanded, 
managed, or dominated by a foreign government.64 
A DOJ handbook on prosecuting intellectual property crimes explains 
that, “if th[e] ‘the entity’ is not a government entity per se, . . . there must be 
‘evidence of foreign government sponsored or coordinated intelligence 
activity’ with the entity.”65 
During the Obama administration, intellectual property theft and 
espionage with a connection to the PRC shifted from isolated cases toward a 
broader program. The FBI expanded its efforts to inform the public of these 
concerns. The 2015 threat awareness film titled “The Company Man: 
Protecting America’s Secrets” depicted an American recruited by PRC 
nationals to engage in industrial espionage.66 Similarly, the 2010 arrest of a 
 
 61 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42681, STEALING TRADE SECRETS AND 
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT 1 (2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42681.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM4H-EF9N] (explaining 
possible imprisonment of fifteen years along with potential fines of millions of dollars). 
 62 About the Division, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST.: NAT’L SEC. DIV. (Apr. 12, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/nsd/about-division [https://perma.cc/5FFL-BSEB] (The Division 
serves a coordinating and unifying function and is tasked with “protect[ing] the United States 
from threats to our national security by pursuing justice through the law.”). 
 63 Economic Espionage and Trade Secret Theft: Are Our Laws Adequate for Today’s 
Threats?, Before the S. Subcomm. On Crime and Terrorism of the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 
113th Cong. 1 (2014) (statement of Randall C. Coleman, Ass’t Dir., Counterintelligence 
Division, Fed. Bureau of Investigation), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/combating-
economic-espionage-and-trade-secret-theft [https://perma.cc/KS3E-YNU3]. 
 64 COMPUT. CRIMES & INTELL. PROP. SECTION, supra note 46, at 182; see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1839(2) (2018) (defining a “foreign agent” as “any officer, employee, proxy, servant, 
delegate, or representative of a foreign government”). 
 65 COMPUT. CRIMES & INTELL. PROP. SECTION, supra note 46, at 182–83 (citing 142 CONG. 
REC. 27,116 (1996)). 
 66 The Company Man: Protecting America’s Secrets, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Jul. 
23, 2015) https://www.fbi.gov/video-repository/newss-the-company-man-protecting-america
s-secrets/view [https://perma.cc/5PS2-ZTH2]. 
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U.S. citizen for making false statements about his relationship with PRC 
intelligence officers—a relationship that began when he was an 
undergraduate studying in Shanghai—was the basis for another FBI film, 
“Game of Pawns: The Glenn Duffie Shriver Story.”67 The FBI explained that 
the film “educates viewers about the foreign intelligence threat Americans 
face abroad.”68 The FBI coupled this overt public messaging with quiet, 
targeted communications: a 2015 letter from the FBI’s Houston field office 
requesting assistance in a “national security investigation” preceded MD 
Anderson Cancer Center’s July 2018 announcement ousting three scientists 
with ties to the PRC.69 
Economic espionage took center stage in 2014 when the DOJ 
announced the indictment of five officers of the PRC People’s Liberation 
Army for cyber intrusions and economic espionage against U.S. 
companies.70 This case broke as Xi Jinping71 was settling into his role as the 
top leader. The U.S. government still sought—albeit with waning 
confidence—to work with the PRC on protecting intellectual property. In 
2015, the U.S.-China Cyber Agreement included a provision on refraining 
from “knowingly supporting cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.”72 
 
 67 Game of Pawns, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Apr. 14 2014) 
https://www.fbi.gov/video-repository/newss-game-of-pawns/view [https://perma.cc/6BD6-
9VEF]. 
 68 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CHINA: THE RISK TO ACADEMIA 8 (2019), 
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/china-risk-to-academia-2019.pdf/view 
[https://perma.cc/HNW9-U79M]. 
 69 Todd Ackerman, MD Anderson Ousts 3 Scientists Over Concerns About Chinese 
Conflicts of Interest, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.houston
chronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/MD-Anderson-fires-3-scientists-over-
concerns-13780570.php [https://perma.cc/Q983-MLGD]. 
 70 Indictment, United States v. Dong, No. 14-188 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/5122014519132358461949.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3VT7-53KW]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers 
for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial 
Advantage (May 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-
hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor [https://perma.cc/Y7MS-9U3L]. 
 71 The common convention is to put family names first in Chinese. This Article places 
Chinese family names first unless the order is reversed in a direct quote or if indicated to be 
the preference of the person named. 
 72 JOHN W. ROLLINS, SUSAN V. LAWRENCE, DIANNE E. RENNACK & CATHERINE A. 
THEOHARY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., UNITED STATES-CHINA CYBER AGREEMENT, IN10376 (2015). 
For earlier efforts at cooperation during the Obama Administration, see, e.g., Eric Holder, U.S. 
Att’y Gen., Address at the International Intellectual Property Summit (Oct. 18, 2010), 18, 
2010) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-
holder-speaks-international-intellectual-property-summit [https://perma.cc/V2LD-L2A2]) (“I 
will travel to Beijing, where I look forward to meeting with my counterparts and other officials 
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In 2016, in a nod to concerns about how criminal law was being used to 
enforce intellectual property rights, the fact sheet from the 27th U.S.-China 
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) included that “[t]he 
United States and China confirm that trade secret investigations are 
conducted in a prudent and cautious manner.”73 
In 2015, the National Security Division released its “Strategic Plan for 
Countering the Economic Espionage Threat.”74 The DOJ framed this plan in 
a country-neutral manner: “To respond effectively to economic espionage, 
[the] DOJ must support a whole-of-government approach, just as it does with 
other national security threats.”75 However, the plan did highlight a case 
connected to the PRC party-state.76 The Strategic Plan also announced the 
intention to “heighten awareness of the economic espionage threat and 
deliver coordinated training,” including to U.S. companies, labs, and 
universities.77 Until 2018, the DOJ had not organized these activities into a 
clear, cohesive strategy aimed at countering what it labeled a “China” threat. 
The PRC party-state’s announcement in 2015 of a “Made in China 
2025” plan in part precipitated heightened scrutiny.78 The plan targeted ten 
strategic industries for development.79 Although innovation is generally 
 
to discuss how we can build on our nations’ bilateral enforcement efforts through the 
Intellectual Property Working Group of the U.S.-China Joint Liaison Group for Law 
Enforcement Cooperation.”). 
 73 U.S. Fact Sheet for the 27th U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, 
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Nov. 2016), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/fact-sheets/2016/november/us-fact-sheet-27th-us-china-joint 
[https://perma.cc/6MEW-P9NQ]; see also PRC Ministry of Commerce, Di 27 jie zhong mei 
shangmao lian weihui lianhe chengguo qingdan (Jan. 6, 2017), http://mds.mofcom.gov.cn
/article/ghlt/201701/20170102497565.shtml [https://perma.cc/BK9S-8J7H] (Chinese version: 
“Zhong mei shuangfang queren, dui shangye mimi anjian de diaocha hui yi jinshen xiaoxin de 
fangshi jinxing”). 
 74 See Richard S. Scott & Alan Z. Rozenshtein, DOJ’s Strategic Plan for Countering the 
Economic Espionage Threat, 64 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 23 (2016). 
 75 Id. at 23; see also H.R. Res. 643, 113th Cong. (2014) (“Calling for further defense 
against the People’s Republic of China’s state-sponsored cyber-enabled theft of trade secrets, 
including by the People’s Liberation Army.”). 
 76 Scott & Rozenshtein, supra note 74, at 24 (citing United States v. Liew, 2014 WL 
2586329 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2014)). 
 77 Id. at 25. 
 78 Scott Kennedy, Made in China 2025, CSIS (June 1, 2015), 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025 [https://perma.cc/Q2X9-AWWH]. 
 79 See U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., MADE IN CHINA 2025: GLOBAL AMBITIONS BUILT ON 
LOCAL PROTECTIONS 10 (2017), https://www.uschamber.com/report/made-china-2025-
global-ambitions-built-local-protections-0 [https://perma.cc/NB8Z-SD3W] (listing strategic 
industries for development, such as next generation information technology and new energy 
vehicles). 
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expected and even encouraged as a country’s economy develops, Assistant 
Attorney General John Demers warned Congress in 2018 that “China has 
committed to pursuing an ‘innovation-driven’ development strategy and 
prioritizing breakthroughs in higher-end innovation. But that is only part of 
the story: ‘Made in China 2025’ is as much a roadmap to theft as it is 
guidance to innovate.”80 This warning recalled a 2013 book titled Chinese 
Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization.81 
The authors describe “an elaborate, comprehensive system for spotting 
foreign technologies, acquiring them by every means imaginable, and 
converting them into weapons and competitive goods.”82 When President 
Trump took office, these developments during the Obama administration 
were coalescing into a more assertive and vocal response to a China threat. 
II. THE CHINA INITIATIVE 
On November 1, 2018, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
announced the commitment of significant resources to counter the “grave 
threat to our national security,”83 under the title of the “China Initiative.” This 
Part describes the design of the China Initiative (Part II.A) and provides an 
overview of how the DOJ has implemented it (Part II.B). 
A. DESIGN 
The China Initiative was launched at a time of growing tensions in many 
facets of the U.S.–PRC relationship. The PRC’s island building in the South 
China Sea created a brash challenge to the United States’ interests in freedom 
of navigation.84 General Secretary Xi’s growing repression at home and 
 
 80 Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 2. 
 81 Arturo G. Munoz, Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military 
Modernization, STUD. IN INTEL., Dec. 2015, at 33 https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-
study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-59-no-4/chinese-industrial-
espionage-technology.html [https://perma.cc/M6DY-WWZR]. 
 82 Id. at 33; see also James Mulvenon, Beyond Espionage: IP Theft, Talent Programs, and 
Cyber Conflict with China, HARV. FAIRBANK CTR. FOR CHINESE STUD. (Apr. 22, 2020), 
https://fairbank.fas.harvard.edu/events/critical-issues-confronting-china-series-10/ 
[https://perma.cc/NE5H-G6QV] (discussing recent trends and noting forthcoming publication 
of follow-on book to Chinese Industrial Espionage). 
 83 Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech Announcing New Initiative to Combat Chinese 
Economic Espionage (Nov. 1, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa
/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-announces-new-initiative-combat-chinese-economic-
espionage [https://perma.cc/EYJ3-UCWN]). 
 84 See Gregory Poling, The Legal Challenge of China’s Island Building, ASIA MAR. 
TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Feb. 18, 2015), https://amti.csis.org/the-legal-challenge-of-
chinas-island-building/ [https://perma.cc/Q27K-LXKD] (analyzing “the military potential of 
China’s unprecedented island building work . . .”). 
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exertion of influence abroad exacerbated worries about the PRC’s human 
rights record and how rights-depriving practices could extend beyond the 
PRC’s borders.85 Trade tensions were also on the rise. Part of the backdrop 
to the China Initiative was a March 2018 report by the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative86 and repeated messaging that “President Trump has 
made it clear we must insist on fair and reciprocal trade with China and 
strictly enforce our laws against unfair trade. This requires taking effective 
action to confront China over its state-led efforts to force, strong-arm, and 
even steal U.S. technology and intellectual property.”87 These comments 
made in the context of trade relations on a state-to-state basis were soon 
echoed by the DOJ in the criminal context. 
In his remarks on November 1, 2018, Attorney General Sessions 
explained that “[t]he Initiative was launched against the background of 
previous findings by the Administration concerning China’s practices.”88 He 
announced that the Criminal Division and National Security Division would 
play key roles.89 Five U.S. Attorneys were also announced as part of the 
Working Group: U.S. Attorneys from the District of Massachusetts, Northern 
District of Alabama, Northern District of California, Eastern District of New 
York, and Northern District of Texas.90 
Included in the China Initiative’s launch was an announcement of 
economic espionage charges against a “PRC State-Owned Company, Taiwan 
Company, and Three Individuals” for the alleged theft of trade secrets from 
Micron, an Idaho-based semiconductor company.91 These charges were 
paradigmatic of the stated purpose of the Initiative: 
 
 85 See, e.g., HOOVER INST., CHINA’S INFLUENCE AND AMERICAN INTERESTS: PROMOTING 
CONSTRUCTIVE VIGILANCE, (Larry Diamond & Orville Schell eds., 2018), 
https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-promoting-
constructive-vigilance [https://perma.cc/B58Q-M9YL] (explaining that General Secretary Xi 
“has significantly expanded the more assertive set of policies initiated by his predecessor Hu 
Jintao”). 
 86 OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 8. 
 87 U.S. Trade Representative, President Trump Announces Strong Actions to Address 
China’s Unfair Trade (Mar. 22, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2018/march/president-trump-announces-strong [https://perma.cc/4VRS-
ST5A]. 
 88 CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 1. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., PRC State-Owned Company, Taiwan Company, and 
Three Individuals Charged with Economic Espionage (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.justice.go
v/opa/pr/prc-state-owned-company-taiwan-company-and-three-individuals-charged-
economic-espionage [https://perma.cc/P49X-2NUC]. 
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[The China Initiative] reflects the strategic priority of countering Chinese national 
security threats and reinforces the President’s overall national security strategy. In 
addition to identifying and prosecuting those engaged in trade secret theft, hacking and 
economic espionage, the initiative will increase efforts to protect our critical 
infrastructure against external threats including foreign direct investment, supply chain 
threats and the foreign agents seeking to influence the American public and 
policymakers without proper registration.92 
Economic espionage cases predate the China Initiative: “Chinese 
national security threats”93 were not new. But the DOJ was now pursuing 
alleged criminal activity as a unified effort. The DOJ had previously created 
initiatives that targeted criminal activities in certain locations.94 To imprint 
this effort with the name of a country, however, was unusual and, perhaps, 
unprecedented.95 
B. IMPLEMENTATION 
Attorney General Sessions initiated the China Initiative,96 but he soon 
departed.97 At William Barr’s confirmation hearing in January 2019, he 
identified the PRC as the United States’ “paramount economic and military 
rival in the world,” and added, “I really thought that Attorney General 
Sessions was right on target in setting up his China initiative in the [DOJ] to 
start going after the pirating of American technology and other kinds of 
 
 92 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese 
Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases (Jan. 28, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/harvard-university-professor-and-two-chinese-nationals-
charged-three-separate-china-related [https://perma.cc/FYN3-DDUP]. 
 93 Id. 
 94 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Fact Sheet: Department of Justice Efforts 
to Combat Mexican Drug Cartels (Apr. 2, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fact-sheet-
department-justice-efforts-combat-mexican-drug-cartels [https://perma.cc/3WAF-TQM5]; 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Announces Resources for Fight 
Against Mexican Drug Cartels (Mar. 24, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-
justice-announces-resources-fight-against-mexican-drug-cartels [https://perma.cc/3LJ8-
GWSX]. 
 95 The author has found no unified listing of all previous Department of Justice initiatives, 
nor any other example of an “Initiative” named for a country. 
 96 See, e.g., Hickey, supra note 9, at 50:00 (describing Sessions’s announcement as 
“sending a signal that cases related to threats from China are a priority, they’re worth spending 
your nights and weekends on, because the stakes of those cases are very high. And the 
prosecutors in the [DOJ] did not disappoint.”). 
 97 Peter Baker, Katie Benner, & Michael D. Shear, Jeff Sessions Is Forced Out as Attorney 
General as Trumps Installs Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/11/07/us/politics/sessions-resigns.html [https://perma.cc/8YL5-XFL5]. 
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illegal activities that Chinese nationals are involved in here in the United 
States, and even abroad.”98 
The Initiative gained momentum under Attorney General Barr. 
Economic espionage was the marquee crime but far from the only one that 
was charged. Other charges include theft of trade secrets, wire fraud, making 
false statements to a government agency, obstruction of justice, violations of 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), violations of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), computer hacking, international 
money laundering, acting as an agent of the PRC without notification to the 
U.S. government, and various conspiracy charges.99 The spectrum of concern 
ranges from classic spying100 to failing to disclose ties to PRC universities 
while receiving federal grant funds.101 
Public statements by DOJ officials portend further expansion of the 
Initiative. Director Wray stated in a June 2020 interview that the FBI had 
more than 2,000 active investigations that link back to the PRC 
government.102 Andrew Lelling, U.S. Attorney for the District of 
Massachusetts, explained in February 2020, “[m]y prediction is that these 
cases will spike at some point and then begin to trail off hopefully as industry 
and academia become more sensitized to the problem. I can tell you that for 
the coming year in Boston what I anticipate frankly is prosecuting more 
 
 98 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. William Pelham Barr to be Attorney 
General of the United States, Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 65 (2019), 
https://www.congress.gov/116/chrg/CHRG-116shrg36846/CHRG-116shrg36846.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WL3A-2X9K]. [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing]. 
 99 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 2. 
 100 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Singaporean National Pleads Guilty to 
Acting in the United States as an Illegal Agent of Chinese Intelligence (July 24, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/singaporean-national-pleads-guilty-acting-united-states-
illegal-agent-chinese-intelligence [https://perma.cc/7TL8-393T]. 
 101 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Researcher at University Arrested for Wire 
Fraud and Making False Statements About Affiliation with a Chinese University (Feb. 27, 
2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/researcher-university-arrested-wire-fraud-and-making
-false-statements-about-affiliation [https://perma.cc/HYY3-Q6UQ]; see also 18 U.S.C. § 666 
(theft of bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds). 
 102 Perano, supra note 3; see also Wray, supra note 4; Barr, supra note 4 (noting in context 
of China Initiative that “you should expect more indictments and prosecutions in the future”); 
see also FBI has 1,000 investigations into Chinese intellectual property theft, director 
Christopher Wray says, calling China the most severe counter-intelligence threat to US, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST (July 24, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3019829/fb
i-has-1000-probes-chinese-intellectual-property-theft-director [https://perma.cc/3SM8-B
9ZB]. 
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people.”103 In an April 2020 article, Assistant Attorney General Demers was 
quoted as expressing a desire that all ninety-four U.S. Attorney’s Offices 
bring cases under the China Initiative, adding, “[y]ou’re not going to do 125 
cases in a year as a U.S. attorney’s office. You’re going to do maybe one, 
which would be great. If you do two, that’s very impressive. If you do none, 
that’s understandable and you’ll get there next year.”104 
A notable aspect of the China Initiative is that the defendants are a broad 
range of people beyond traditional state-directed spies. The DOJ has stressed 
the role of “nontraditional collectors” such as researchers at universities and 
for-profit laboratories.105 In July 2018, FBI Director Wray stated, “I think 
China, from a counterintelligence perspective, in many ways represents the 
broadest, most challenging, most significant threat we face as a country. And 
I say that because for them, it is a whole of state effort. It is economic 
espionage as well as traditional espionage; it is nontraditional collectors as 
well as traditional intelligence operatives; it’s human sources as well as cyber 
means.”106 This concern is seen in the DOJ’s emphasis on the “Thousand 
Talents Plan,” a program sponsored by the PRC party-state to recruit people 
“with full professorships or the equivalent in prestigious foreign universities 
and R&D institutes” to work in the PRC.107 A November 2019 report by the 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found that “[t]he FBI’s 
 
 103 Andrew Lelling, U.S. Att’y for the Dist. of Mass., Remarks at the CSIS China Initiative 
Conference, at 01:00:43 (Feb. 6, 2020), (video available at https://www.csis.org/events/china-
initiative-conference [https://perma.cc/2VTX-K5YP]). 
 104 Betsy Woodruff Swan, Inside DOJ’s nationwide effort to take on China, POLITICO 
(Apr. 7, 2020, 9:37 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/07/justice-department-
china-espionage-169653 [https://perma.cc/T72W-W6GV]. 
 105 See, e.g., Open Hearing on Worldwide Threats Before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 115th Cong. 2 (2018) (statement of Christopher Wray, Dir. of the Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation) (“I think in this setting I would just say that the use of nontraditional collectors, 
especially in the academic setting, whether it’s professors, scientists, students, we see in 
almost every—in almost every field office that the FBI has around the country . . . .”); see also 
WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF TRADE AND MFG. POL’Y, HOW CHINA’S ECONOMIC AGGRESSION 
THREATENS THE TECHNOLOGIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
WORLD, 31 n.113 (June 18, 2018) https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/
06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XFM-QZ97] 
(noting that the term “‘non-traditional collector’ is commonly used in the Intelligence 
Community . . . .”). 
 106 Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the Aspen Security 
Forum (July 18, 2018), (transcript available at https://www.aspeninstitute.org/podcasts/fbi-
director-christopher-wray-on-russian-meddling-2/ [https://perma.cc/8KBD-HWP5]. 
 107 Recruitment Program of Global Experts, The Recruitment Program for Innovative 
Talents (Long Term), www.1000plan.org.cn/en/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020) (for people who 
sign contracts “for at least 3 consecutive years and with at least 2 months each year working 
in China”) [https://perma.cc/8UXH-V6A8]. 
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slow response to Chinese recruitment operations through the [Thousand 
Talents Plan] and other talent recruitment plans provided the Chinese 
government the opportunity to recruit U.S.-based researchers and 
scientists.”108 
The Thousand Talents Plan was a central feature of the January 2020 
charges against Harvard professor Charles Lieber for “making materially 
false, fictitious and fraudulent statements.” 109 An indictment was issued in 
June 2020.110 A nanoscience specialist, Dr. Lieber had received U.S. 
government grant funding that required disclosure of significant foreign 
financial conflicts of interest.111 He allegedly failed to disclose his 
relationship with Wuhan University of Technology and his participation in 
the Thousand Talents Plan, through which he received $50,000 per month in 
addition to living and lab expenses.112 The DOJ indicated that additional 
arrests in academia would be forthcoming,113 with “academic espionage” 
increasingly entering the lexicon as part of the China threat.114 On February 
27, 2020, the DOJ announced the arrest of a University of Tennessee 
professor on charges of fraud and false statements connected to his alleged 
 
 108 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 116TH CONG., THREATS TO 
THE U.S. RESEARCH ENTERPRISE: CHINA’S TALENT RECRUITMENT PLANS 94 (2019), 
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019-11-18%20PSI%20Staff%20Report%20-
%20China’s%20Talent%20Recruitment%20Plans.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5DR-WFZW]. For 
an analysis of the Thousand Talents Plan and similar programs, see David Zweig & Siqin 
Kang, America Challenges China’s National Talent Programs, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND 
INT’L STUD. (May 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/america-challenges-chinas-national-
talent-programs [https://perma.cc/SX75-P3F5]. 
 109 U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 92 (other cases announced at the same time involved 
Ye Yanqing (a lieutenant in the PRC military who allegedly lied on her visa form and 
continued to work for the PRC military while in the United States) and Zheng Zaosong (who 
allegedly stole biological research from a Boston hospital that was later discovered inside a 
sock by airport security)). 
 110 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Harvard University Professor Indicted on False 
Statement Charges (June 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/harvard-university-
professor-indicted-false-statement-charges [https://perma.cc/E7MB-WJWD]. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Michele McPhee, The China Spy Scandal That Entangled Harvard Could Hit Yale and 
MIT Next, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 29, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/china-spy-
scandal-that-entangled-harvard-could-hit-yale-mit-next-1489806?amp=1 
[https://perma.cc/WP8R-BV49] (“Federal law enforcement sources tell Newsweek that last 
month’s arrest of Charles Lieber . . . is just ‘the first domino to fall.’”). 
 114 See, e.g., House Defense Bill Includes Provisions on Academic Espionage, For-Profit 
Oversight, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC. (July 15, 2019), https://www.acenet.edu/news-
room/Pages/House-Defense-Bill-Includes-Provisions-on-Academic-Espionage-For-Profit-
Oversight.aspx [https://perma.cc/5CA7-L4GH]. 
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affiliation with the Beijing University of Technology.115 On March 10, 2020, 
the DOJ announced that a former West Virginia University professor pleaded 
guilty to fraud charges connected to his involvement in the Thousand Talents 
Plan.116 
Also of growing interest are PRC-connected actors who are allegedly 
influencing the “American public and policymakers without proper 
registration.”117 In May 2019, the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force added 
a unit aimed at countering China’s political influence in the United States.118 
This unit strengthened the FBI’s investigatory pipeline that can lay the 
foundation for later prosecutions. The U.S. government’s announcement in 
February 2020 that representatives of five prominent PRC news agencies 
would be treated as foreign government functionaries further heightened 
attention on efforts by the PRC party-state to influence opinion in the United 
States.119 
The DOJ has underscored the long-term nature of the China Initiative. 
John Demers said in February 2020, “our work is far from done. We must 
settle in for the long haul against the government that proposes a very 
different set of social, political, and economic values from those of us in the 
west.”120 John Brown, Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterintelligence 
Division, similarly warned, “[d]oes the world go through Communist China 
 
 115 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Researcher at University Arrested for Wire Fraud 
and Making False Statements About Affiliation with a Chinese University (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/researcher-university-arrested-wire-fraud-and-making-false-
statements-about-affiliation [https://perma.cc/QTS2-7L5R]. 
 116 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former West Virginia University Professor Pleads 
Guilty to Fraud That Enabled Him to Participate in the [PRC]’s “Thousand Talents Plan” 
(Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-west-virginia-university-professor-
pleads-guilty-fraud-enabled-him-participate-people [https://perma.cc/2PZX-NUEC]. 
 117 U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 92. 
 118 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Exclusive: How the FBI Combats China’s Political 
Meddling, AXIOS (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.axios.com/fbi-china-us-political-influence-
0e70d07c-2d60-47cd-a5c3-6c72b2064941.html [https://perma.cc/8NP7-ZE68]. 
 119 Lara Jakes & Steven Lee Meyers, U.S. Designates China’s Official Media as 
Operatives of the Communist State, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/02/18/world/asia/china-media-trump.html [https://perma.cc/2QFS-RVCJ] (naming 
Xinhua, CGTN, China Radio, China Daily and The People’s Daily). At the time of writing, 
both the United States and the PRC governments were escalating restrictions on 
media/journalist presences in each other’s countries. See Vivian Wang & Edward Wong, U.S. 
Hits Back at China With New Visa Restrictions on Journalists, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/09/us/politics/china-journalists-us-visa-crackdown.html 
[https://perma.cc/65QT-M2BZ]. 
 120 John Demers, Assistant Att’y Gen. for Nat’l Security, Remarks at the CSIS China 
Initiative Conference at 00:03 (Feb. 6, 2020), (video available at https://www.csis.org/events
/china-initiative-conference [https://perma.cc/2VTX-K5YP]). 
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or the United States in the next 30 years. We have been deceived too 
long . . . . I think we have woken up . . . . Now is a time for action. That action 
is together.”121 Beyond the DOJ, in July 2020, Secretary of State Michael 
Pompeo likewise accentuated a protracted conflict ahead: “We must admit a 
hard truth that should guide us in the years and decades to come, that if we 
want to have a free 21st century, and not the Chinese century of which Xi 
Jinping dreams, the old paradigm of blind engagement with China simply 
won’t get it done.”122 
To date, the DOJ’s role in this new paradigm has largely focused on 
investigating and prosecuting cases, but these activities have proceeded 
alongside a public outreach component. As explained in Part IV.E, this 
outreach has yet to mature into a sustained two-way conversation but rather 
has principally served as an opportunity for the government to explain its 
view of the threat. The Office of Private Sector engages with academic 
associations, private companies, and other nongovernmental entities.123 
Created in 2017, the Office grew out of a need to have “an organized, 
coordinated, and horizontal approach” to interacting with the private sector 
in today’s complex threat environment.124 An October 2019 summit 
addressed “how the academic community can continue to work with the FBI 
and other federal agencies to tackle national security threats on our 
campuses.”125 These efforts are laudable and should be expanded.126 
Nonetheless, even more robust interaction between the DOJ and 
nongovernment sectors is insufficient to fully ameliorate concerns. The 
“China” framing is fundamentally flawed. The DOJ should begin by 
rethinking, and reworking, the China Initiative. 
 
 121 John Brown, Assistant Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Counterintelligence 
Division, Remarks at the CSIS China Initiative Conference at 01:00:01 (Feb. 6, 2020), (video 
available at https://www.csis.org/events/china-initiative-conference [https://perma.cc/2VTX-
K5YP]). 
 122 Pompeo, supra note 7. 
 123 Office of Private Sector, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/about/
partnerships/office-of-private-sector [https://perma.cc/H2RZ-P349] (last visited Jan. 3. 2021). 
 124 Id.; see also This Week Strengthening Partnerships With American’s Business 
Community, Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.fbi.gov/audio-
repository/ftw-podcast-office-of-private-sector-113017.mp3/view [https://perma.cc/Q3U5-
PHZC]. 
 125 Wray, supra note 4; see also Memorandum from Fed. Bureau of Investigations Off. of 
Priv. Sector Summarizing 2019 FBI Academia Summit (Oct. 10, 2019) (available at 
https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Science-Security/2019-FBI-
OPS-Academic-Summit-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS4E-TS2L]). 
 126 Wray, supra note 4 (“Through our Office of Private Sector, the FBI has stepped up our 
national outreach to spread awareness of this threat . . . . Our Office of Private Sector also 
engages with a variety of academic associations on the China threat . . . .”). 
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III. CRIMINALIZING CHINA 
The Obama administration’s export control reform initiative’s goal was 
“to build high walls around a smaller yard” by focusing on protecting “crown 
jewels.”127 As the Trump administration’s concerns about PRC-linked 
national security threats increased, analysts outside the government revived 
this “small yard, high fence” approach as a prudent way of being “selective 
in choosing technologies that need protecting, but be[ing] aggressive in 
safeguarding them.”128 The China Initiative’s focus is not only what is 
protected within the fence but also who is of particular concern when they 
are within the fence. It is not just a matter of being physically within the 
United States’ borders, though that is the most conspicuous manner of 
stealing intellectual property located therein. The concern is also people 
reaching into the fenced area through cyber-intrusions that do not require 
physical presence.129 
The U.S. government’s attention is increasingly on intrusions by entities 
that are connected to “China.” Assistant Attorney General Demers testified 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee in December 2018, “From 2011 [to] 
2018, more than 90 percent of the Department’s cases alleging economic 
espionage by or to benefit a state involve China, and more than two-thirds of 
the Department’s theft of trade secrets cases have had a nexus to China.”130 
In his remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on 
February 6, 2020, FBI Director Wray explained as follows: “The first thing 
I think we need to understand about the threat from China is just how diverse 
and multilayered it is. And I say that in terms of its techniques, its actors, and 
in its targets.”131 
 
 127 Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet on the President’s Export Control Reform 
Initiative (Apr. 20, 2010), https://fas.org/sgp/news/2010/04/wh-export.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q38Q-8A8K]; see also Steven Aftergood, Export Control Policy as a Guide 
to Secrecy Reform, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Apr. 26, 2010), https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy
/2010/04/export_control/ [https://perma.cc/W6UT-MW6H] (discussing the reform initiative). 
 128 Lorand Laskai & Samm Sacks, The Right Way to Protect America’s Innovation 
Advantage, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-
23/right-way-protect-americas-innovation-advantage [https://perma.cc/62HZ-J27G]. 
 129 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Chinese Intelligence Officers and Their Recruited 
Hackers and Insiders Conspired to Steal Sensitive Commercial Aviation and Technological 
Data for Years (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-intelligence-officers-
and-their-recruited-hackers-and-insiders-conspired-steal [https://perma.cc/FA7L-6H8W] 
(“The threat posed by Chinese government-sponsored hacking activity is real and 
relentless . . . .”). 
 130 Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 5. 
 131 Wray, supra note 4; see also Lutz, supra note 33 (“China from a counterintelligence 
perspective represents the broadest, most challenging threat we face at this time . . . because 
with them it’s a whole state effort.”). 
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What is this “it” of a “China” threat? Later in those same remarks, 
Director Wray added, “[t]o be clear, this is not about the Chinese people as a 
whole, and it sure as heck is not about Chinese Americans as a group. But it 
is about the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party.”132 Yet 
such interspersed words of assurance do not erase the China Initiative’s 
conflation of the PRC party-state (Part III.A) with PRC nationality and 
national origin (Part III.B) as well as Chinese ethnicity (Part III.C) into an 
amorphous, and even existential, threat.133 There are a host of conditions each 
of which is alone sufficient to connect a person—natural or legal—to the 
“China” in the China Initiative. Some of these conditions are immutable (e.g., 
DNA), but China-ness can also be acquired:134 one can create connections to 
“China” such that a criminal taint attaches (Part III.D). In her book Prisoners 
of Politics, Rachel Barkow discusses “lumpy” laws that group crimes of 
varying seriousness and blameworthiness.135 The DOJ’s conception of 
“China” similarly lumps together an array of people and entities seen as 
sharing ties to a common threat. For instance, the opening sentence of a July 
2020 press release announcing fraud and false statements charges describes 
“[a] rheumatology professor and researcher with strong ties to China . . . .”136 
 
 132 Wray, supra note 4. 
 133 See, e.g., Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, Address at the Nat’l Governors Ass’n 
Winter Meeting: U.S. States and the China Competition (Feb. 8, 2020) (transcript available at 
https://www.state.gov/u-s-states-and-the-china-competition/ [https://perma.cc/DN7Z-GW
YN]) (“We want talented, young Chinese students to come study in the United States of 
America.” . . . . The China competition is happening. It’s happening in your states, and it’s a 
competition that goes to the very basic freedoms that every one of us values.”); Eric Tucker, 
US Researchers on Front Line of Battle Against Chinese Theft, AP NEWS (Oct. 6, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/article/afbf4d7f4aac4745b01852571179ceb3 [https://perma.cc/UUR4-
4HT3] (quoting Nat’l Counterintelligence and Security Ctr. Dir. William Evanina as saying: 
“Existentially, we look at China as our greatest threat from an intelligence perspective, and 
they succeeded significantly in the last decade from stealing our best and brightest 
technology.”). 
 134 “China-ness” is not a common phrase. In writing this Article, however, the use of 
“China-ness” was found in an ethnographic account of “Mainland Chinese undergraduates” 
studying in Singapore. Peidong Yang, A Phenomenology of being “Very China”: An 
Ethnographic Report on the Self-Formation Experiences of Mainland Chines Undergraduate 
“Foreign Talents” in Singapore, 42 ASIAN J. SOC. SCI. 233, 245 (2014) (“Indeed, anything 
ranging from ‘bad’ sartorial sense to clumsy Chinese-accented English to the lack of polish in 
social manners could be reflected upon by the Chinese scholars in retrospect as ‘very China’-
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 135 RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS 22 (2019). 
 136 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Researcher Charged with Illegally Using U.S. Grant 
Funds to Develop Scientific Expertise for China (July 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov
/opa/pr/researcher-charged-illegally-using-us-grant-funds-develop-scientific-expertise-china 
[https://perma.cc/P8T8-KLN6] (emphasis added). 
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This Part breaks down various ties to a broad conception of “China” that 
are interwoven into the China Initiative. This Article contends that using 
“China” as the glue connecting cases under the Initiative’s umbrella creates 
an overinclusive conception of the threat and attaches a criminal taint to 
entities that possess “China-ness.” To be clear, prosecutors are not relieved 
of the burden of proving all elements of charged offenses beyond a 
reasonable doubt.137 This is not blunt guilt by association. It is threat by 
association. 
Not only does China-ness become imprinted as a shared negative 
characteristic across cases, but the language used in the Initiative 
anthropomorphizes China into a form that is ascribed condemnation. 
Attorney General Barr warned, “Chinese theft by hacking has been 
prominent . . . . Those actions by China are continuing, and you should 
expect more indictments and prosecutions in the future . . . . China 
complements its plainly illicit activities with facially legal but predatory 
behavior.”138 A DOJ presentation on the China Initiative includes a slide 
titled, “What Has China Stolen?”139 When announcing indictments under the 
China Initiative in January 2020, an FBI Boston Division Special Agent 
remarked, “China’s goal, simply put, is to replace the United States as the 
world’s leading superpower, and they’re breaking the law to get there.”140 
Secretary of State Pompeo amplified these sentiments in his July 2020 speech 
by stating, “China ripped off our prized intellectual property and trade 
secrets . . . .”141 
Because China is not an actor that can be convicted and punished, 
people cannot have traditional accomplice liability flowing from China’s 
 
 137 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the 
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
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Security Threats from the Chinese Government,” supra note 20. 
 140 Joseph R. Bonavolonta, Fed. Bureau of Investigation Bos. Div. Special Agent in 
Charge, Remarks Announcing Charges Against Harvard University Professor and Two 
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actions.142 China itself cannot steal a robot arm143 or a corn seed.144 
Nonetheless, the China Initiative spreads a blanket of criminal suspicion over 
persons associated with China. For example, in the case of Robert Mo, who 
pled guilty to the theft of corn seeds that were the intellectual property of 
DuPont Pioneer and Monsanto,145 “[t]he atmosphere surrounding economic 
espionage investigations became so explosive that the federal judge in Mo’s 
case barred unnecessary mention of his ethnicity.”146 The judge recognized 
that his China-ness created an impediment to a fair trial. 
To be sure, just as China is not a monolith, neither is the DOJ. From this 
author’s experience, individuals in the U.S. government working on the 
China Initiative vary with respect to how they conceive of the threat, how 
they describe the threat, and how sensitive they are to the ways that external 
audiences perceive the government’s language and actions. The point here is 
not to malign the motives of hardworking investigators and prosecutors,147 
but rather it is to articulate concerns regarding the framework within which 
they are working. An initiative can be both well intentioned and 
fundamentally flawed. 
A country-based framing is a particularly awkward fit for the DOJ, 
which is not a part of the U.S. government with deep, country-specific 
expertise. The DOJ has an Office of International Affairs that coordinates 
interactions with foreign governments, an FBI presence in the Beijing 
embassy, and a history of stationing Assistant U.S. Attorneys in Beijing on a 
 
 142 Cf. 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 161 (2d ed. 2020) (“An accomplice is one who 
knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent unites with another to commit a crime, or in 
some way advocates or encourages commission of the crime.”). 
 143 Laurel Wamsley, A Robot Named ‘Tappy’: Huawei Conspired to Steal T-Mobile’s 
Trade Secrets, Says DOJ, NPR (Jan. 29, 2019, 4:37 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/01
/29/689663720/a-robot-named-tappy-huawei-conspired-to-steal-t-mobile-s-trade-secrets-
says-doj [https://perma.cc/2AX7-7HBG]. 
 144 Protecting Vital Assets: Pilfering of Corn Seeds Illustrates Intellectual Property Theft, 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/senten
cing-in-corn-seed-intellectual-property-theft-case [https://perma.cc/K8XF-S6B8]. 
 145 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Chinese National Sentenced to Prison for 
Conspiracy to Steal Trade Secrets (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-
national-sentenced-prison-conspiracy-steal-trade-secrets [https://perma.cc/PJA8-BUBP]. 
 146 Mara Hvistendahl, Surveillance Planes, Car Chases, and a FISA Warrant: How a 
Chinese Immigrant Became a Pawn in America’s Technological Cold War with Beijing, 
VANITY FAIR (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/01/how-chinese-
immigrant-became-pawn-in-us-technological-cold-war-with-beijing 
[https://perma.cc/7BRY-D64M]. 
 147 See Wray, supra note 13 (“Our folks at the FBI are working their tails off every day to 
protect our nation’s companies, our universities, our computer networks, and our ideas and 
innovation.”). 
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rotating basis to act in a liaison function.148 However, the Office of 
International Affairs does not have any visible role in the China Initiative’s 
leadership or working group. Nor has DOJ developed a cadre of investigators 
and prosecutors who have substantial linguistic, cultural, and political 
expertise relevant to the PRC as one would find in the State Department. FBI 
Director Wray recognized the importance of language skills in an April 2019 
interview,149 but it is unclear to what extent DOJ is making progress in 
building linguistic capacity let alone broader expertise on the PRC. 
This is also not to say that the DOJ stands alone in presenting a 
problematic framing of a China threat. Similar trends are seen in other aspects 
of U.S. policy toward the PRC.150 Strongly worded warnings are also found 
on both sides of the political aisle: then-presidential candidate Joe Biden, for 
example, was criticized for exacerbating xenophobic trends when a campaign 
ad claimed that “Trump rolled over for the Chinese.”151 A comprehensive 
accounting of how the U.S. government views the PRC party-state and 
 
 148 See Office of Int’l Affairs, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-oia 
[https://perma.cc/6QMX-ATGX] (last visited Nov. 19. 2020); Contact Us: Beijing, China, 
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26, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-christopher-wray-0 [https://perma.cc/RP
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entities affiliated therewith is beyond the scope of this article.152 While 
highlighting how hawkish rhetoric permeated the Trump administration,153 
the focus here is to demonstrate how—at least with respect to the parts of the 
DOJ responsible for criminal prosecutions—the approach should be adjusted 
to better fit their particular perch of pursuing individual criminal liability. 
Nor does this Article mean to dismiss concerns about the PRC party-
state both incentivizing and sometimes explicitly directing actors to engage 
in conduct that breaks U.S. laws.154 More generally, the PRC party-state’s 
track record when it comes to respecting human rights and the rule of law is 
increasingly worrisome under General Secretary Xi.155 There is, however, a 
better path to dealing with real concerns about the PRC party-state than the 
U.S. government’s current response. We do not know the extent to which the 
ballooning of cases under the China Initiative is due to an uptick in illegal 
activities linked to the PRC party-state as compared with the U.S. 
government directing investigative resources in a way that is unearthing 
long-standing issues. The exact scale and escalation of activities are 
 
 152 See, e.g., HOOVER INSTITUTION WORKING GROUP ON CHINESE INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES 
IN THE UNITED STATES, CHINESE INFLUENCE & AMERICAN INTEREST: PROMOTING 
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 154 See, e.g., Hickey, supra note 9, at 57:00 (noting when discussing slide titled “China 
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the fact”). 
 155 See generally Margaret K. Lewis, Why China Should Unsign the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 53 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 131 (2020) (arguing that, 
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standards required of signatories to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
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unknown,156 but there is a problem with intellectual-property theft.157 How 
the DOJ is addressing that threat is, however, a problem in itself. 
A. THE PRC PARTY-STATE 
Economic espionage requires proof that the intellectual-property theft 
is linked to a “foreign government.”158 The power structure in the PRC blends 
state and political party in a way that is vastly different from how those terms 
are used in the United States. In the United States, candidates generally run 
under parties’ banners without holding significant positions within the 
parties’ structure (e.g., chairperson of the Democratic National 
Committee).159 Nor do either of the major political parties in the United 
States have an organizational structure that is enmeshed in, and actually 
supersedes, the government. In the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) is both inexorably intertwined with and superior to the formal 
government.160 “President” Xi Jinping may be the more familiar title to 
American audiences, but his real power lies in his position as General 
Secretary of the CCP.161 
 
 156 See, e.g., THE COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THE 
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of intellectual property theft—not China specific—to range from $225 billion to $600 billion); 
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chamber/ [https://perma.cc/B26H-63K6]. (analyzing the challenges of defining “IP theft” and 
calculating losses that can be attributable to China). 
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 158 See supra notes 50–65 and accompanying text. 
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The interconnections between party and state in the PRC are not easily 
conveyed in visual depictions, yet they resemble two strands in a double 
helix: an entity can exist in the state strand or party strand, but it is never far 
removed from a bond that would connect it to the other side.162 Under 
General Secretary Xi, this dynamic of party and state has shifted to an even 
more party-centric structure, as if the party is the nucleus of an atom with 
lightweight government bodies orbiting it.163 
It is this juggernaut of PRC party-state that is the foreign government 
for economic espionage purposes. In that respect, the DOJ’s conflation of the 
PRC’s formal government and the CCP as an intermeshed structure is an 
accurate description of power distribution in the PRC. Where the DOJ’s 
description of “China” in the China Initiative takes a fear-provoking turn is 
by repeated intimations of a communist threat. William Evanina, Director of 
the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, stressed in February 
2020, “Xi Jinping has one goal: to be the global leader geopolitically, 
militarily, and economically. And he and his communist party will stop at 
nothing to get there.”164 John Brown of the FBI likewise emphasized the 
increase in intellectual-property theft “for the benefit of communist 
China . . . communist China” and set up a stark contrast: “Does the world go 
through communist China or the United States in the next 30 years?”165 
Attorney General Barr warned in July 2020 that “[a] world marching to the 
beat of Communist China’s drums will not be a hospitable one . . . .”166 The 
Trump administration’s broader accentuation of the “Communist” in CCP 
was made all the more clear by titling Secretary of State Pompeo’s major 
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In name, the CCP is a communist party. In reality, the CCP bears little 
resemblance to textbook communism.168 It is better understood as the 
backbone of a deeply repressive, authoritarian state that has allowed limited 
economic reforms with “signs point[ing] toward further entrenchment of 
statism.”169 Rhetoric that presents the challenge as a clash with communism 
is misplaced.170 A more accurate path would be for the DOJ to adopt 
consistent phrasing of a “PRC party-state.” The U.S. government can be 
extremely disciplined with fraught language, as demonstrated by the delicate 
terminology used in the context of “Taiwan” and the United States’ “One 
China Policy.”171 In the context of national security concerns linked to the 
PRC, the DOJ can and should be more precise in describing the node of the 
threat. One indication that this might be starting to occur is the titling of FBI 
Director Wray’s February speech as “Confronting the China Threat”172 but 
his July speech as “The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the 
Chinese Communist Party to the Economic and National Security of the 
United States.”173 It is unclear, however, the extent to which this shift reflects 
a deeper grappling with the complex nature of the PRC party-state and how 
best to express this in the U.S. government’s language. 
The DOJ’s expansive description of the challenge that the PRC party-
state poses is also accurate insofar as the CCP’s influence reaches beyond the 
approximately 90 million CCP members.174 Nonetheless, phrasing such as 
“[t]he CCP has launched an orchestrated campaign, across all of its many 
tentacles in Chinese government and society, to exploit the openness of our 
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institutions in order to destroy them[,]” as used by Attorney General Barr, 
expresses these interconnections in a sinister manner.175 The reality of what 
Party membership means—let alone tangential ties by virtue of being a PRC 
citizen living in the PRC today—is complex.176 This texture is lost in the 
blunt Communist-threat rhetoric that dominated during the Trump 
administration. 
The DOJ’s description of “China” in the China Initiative also lacks a 
recognition of the space, albeit constrained, for entities within the PRC to 
withstand pressure to engage in “coordinated intelligence activity”177 with 
the PRC party-state. Andrew Lelling, U.S. Attorney for the District of 
Massachusetts, asserted, “If you are collaborating with any Chinese entity, 
whether it’s a university or a business, you are giving that technology to the 
Chinese government.”178 In contrast, William Zarit, a senior counselor at The 
Cohen Group with a long career in the U.S. foreign commercial service, 
cautioned, the U.S. government needs to be “balanced in our approach . . . we 
have to be very, very clear that we don’t punish the Chinese people in this 
whole process, but actually focus on the real culprits.”179 
This demarcation between “Chinese people” and “real culprits” is not 
clear cut. If “real culprits” means only the PRC leadership, they too are 
people who are Chinese. If “real culprits” is expanded to CCP members 
versus “Chinese people,” that takes approximately 90 million people out of 
the “Chinese people” and fails to account for the significant variation among 
CCP members. The Chinese people and the PRC party-state simply do not 
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separate neatly into two entirely discrete categories.180 Yet the Trump 
administration used a binary framing: Secretary of State Pompeo explained 
in July 2020 that the United States must “engage and empower the Chinese 
people—a dynamic, freedom-loving people who are completely distinct from 
the Chinese Communist Party.”181 
Thus, on the one hand, comments like that from U.S. Attorney Lelling 
above indicate that contact with “any Chinese entity” is tantamount to 
handing information to the Chinese government. On the other hand, Pompeo 
separated Party and people into two buckets. Both of these approaches 
diminish the space for human agency: individuals making decisions. If an 
individual’s actions break the law, then prosecuting that individual might be 
warranted. To the extent that individuals are not just breaking the law but 
doing so in ways that benefit the PRC party-state, then this triggers national 
security concerns. Countering efforts by the PRC leadership to incentivize 
and even direct individuals to engage in acts that violate U.S. law is exactly 
what U.S. law enforcement should be doing. The question is how this work 
is being done. The China Initiative has conflated the central concern on 
activities intertwined with the PRC party-state with a broader conception of 
China-ness that encompasses PRC nationality and national origin as well as 
Chinese ethnicity and other expressions of connections with “China.” 
B. PRC NATIONALS AND NATIONAL ORIGIN 
The DOJ has stated repeatedly that the China Initiative is not targeted 
at PRC nationals or people who have familial ties to the PRC.182 The FBI’s 
publication titled, “China: The Risk to Academia,” explains that the “FBI 
recognizes, and values, [the] unique package of benefits these international 
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students and professors provide.” 183 This assurance is undercut by the same 
publication’s warning that the United States’ open academic environment 
“also puts academia at risk for exploitation by foreign actors who do not 
follow our rules or share our values,” and that “the Chinese government uses 
some Chinese students—mostly post-graduate students and post-doctorate 
researchers studying science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
(STEM)—and professors to operate as non-traditional collectors of 
intellectual property . . . .”184 
Rhetoric entangling the PRC party-state with people who hold PRC 
citizenship, have familial ties to the PRC, or both is rife in the China 
Initiative. In January 2019 when announcing charges against 
telecommunications company Huawei, Acting Attorney General Matthew 
Whitaker stated, “[a]s I told Chinese officials in August, China must hold its 
citizens and Chinese companies accountable for complying with the law.”185 
At his confirmation hearing, Attorney General Barr stated his support for the 
China Initiative and how it was “going after the pirating of American 
technology and other kinds of illegal activities that Chinese nationals are 
involved in here in the United States, and even abroad.”186 In February 2020, 
Attorney General Barr again blurred the lines between the party-state and the 
broader population by cautioning, “[t]he Chinese have long been a 
commercial people. But for China, purely economic success is not an end in 
itself.”187 In July 2020, Secretary of State Pompeo warned of the threat posed 
by PRC nationals in the United States, stating “not all Chinese students and 
employees are just normal students and workers that are coming here to make 
a little bit of money and to garner themselves some knowledge. Too many of 
them come here to steal our intellectual property and to take this back to their 
country.”188 
Admittedly, the percentage of people illegally engaged in acquiring 
intellectual property for the benefit of the PRC party-state who are PRC 
nationals is unknown. It is logical that a higher percentage of people engaged 
in these illicit activities would be PRC nationals as compared with Canadian, 
Cambodian, or Chilean nationals. This Article does not recommend that the 
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DOJ allocate investigatory resources proportionally across people from all 
nations. Nevertheless, there is a difference between prioritizing intellectual 
property theft and following evidence of suspicious activity wherever it may 
lead (even if to a higher proportion of PRC nationals) and setting forth with 
the explicit intention of countering a “China” threat and then having that 
framing influence where the inquiry leads. The former starts from a premise 
that PRC nationals have space to be distinct from the PRC party-state, 
whereas the latter conflates citizenship with the governing power structure. 
For instance, a February 10, 2020, DOJ press release announcing an 
indictment under the banner of the China Initiative points to an “unacceptable 
pattern of state-sponsored computer intrusions and thefts by China and 
its citizens.”189 A February 15, 2019, DOJ announcement of “Chinese 
National Sentenced to Prison for Selling Counterfeit Computer Parts” begins, 
“[a] Beijing, China man [sic] was sentenced today to 54 months in federal 
prison for directing the shipment of counterfeit computer-networking 
equipment into the Southern District of Texas.”190 
Concerns about conflation of PRC party-state with PRC nationals—and 
people who once held that status even if they later changed their 
citizenship—predate the China Initiative.191 Warnings about suspicion at 
least in part based on nationality have also reached beyond the PRC context. 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and Orly Lobel wrote in 2016, “[t]hrough 
references to ‘Chinese actors [as] the world’s most active and persistent 
perpetrators’ and to ‘the many Russian immigrants with advanced technical 
skills who work for leading US companies,’ the argument for greater 
protection [of intellectual property] appears to derive at least some of its 
power from xenophobia.”192 
Recognition that a response to activities directed by the PRC party-state 
would increase suspicion of PRC nationals ramped up with the launch of the 
China Initiative. In his December 2018 Senate testimony, John Demers 
stressed the need to focus on nontraditional collectors including researchers, 
 
 189 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Chinese Military Personnel Charged with Computer 
Fraud, Economic Espionage and Wire Fraud for Hacking into Credit Reporting Agency 
Equifax, (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-military-personnel-
charged-computer-fraud-economic-espionage-and-wire-fraud-hacking 
[https://perma.cc/V963-C6WT]. 
 190 Press Release, U.S. Dept’ of Just., Chinese National Sentenced to Prison for Selling 
Counterfeit Computer Parts (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-
sentenced-prison-selling-counterfeit-computer-parts [https://perma.cc/D3TB-ZH4D]. 
 191 See, e.g., MARA HVISTENDAHL, THE SCIENTIST AND THE SPY: A TRUE STORY OF CHINA, 
THE FBI, AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE (2020) (recounting the story of a PRC-born scientist 
pursued by the U.S. government for trying to steal trade secrets). 
 192 Dreyfuss & Lobel, supra note 51, at 426 (internal citations omitted). 
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“some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions and 
conflicted loyalties.”193 A 2019 FBI case example of a “Chinese Citizen’s 
Theft of Weapons Technology for Chinese Employment Opportunity” refers 
to the “Chinese citizen” sixteen times on a single page and lists the following 
as the first “Lessons Learned”: “Divided Loyalty to a Country[:] The Chinese 
citizen felt the U.S. company’s information would benefit Chinese weapons 
and aerospace programs.”194 Assistant Attorney General Demers further 
warned of existent, albeit unverifiable to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard, ties between the PRC party-state and a “Chinese company” in one 
case and a “Chinese scientist” in another: 
And while we could not prove in court that these thefts were directed by the Chinese 
government, there is no question that they are in perfect consonance with Chinese 
government economic policy. The absence of meaningful protections for intellectual 
property in China, the paucity of cooperation with any requests for assistance in 
investigating these cases, the plethora of state sponsored enterprises, and the 
authoritarian control exercised by the Communist Party amply justify the conclusion 
that the Chinese government is ultimately responsible for those thefts, too.195 
The Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the National Security 
Division reiterated these cases of a “Chinese company” and “Chinese 
scientist” for which, although the DOJ lacked proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, conditions in the PRC “amply justify the conclusion that the Chinese 
government is in some sense responsible for those thefts, too.”196 
The DOJ’s depiction of a string-pulling PRC party-state behind the 
scenes is reflected in the December 2019 report by the JASON group 
(commissioned by the National Science Foundation) on “Fundamental 
Research Security.” 197 The Report found regarding the actions of the 
 
 193 Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 8. 
 194 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CASE EXAMPLE: NON-TRADITIONAL COLLECTOR 
(2019), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/china-case-example-weapons-technology-2019.
pdf/view [https://perma.cc/Z448-JFZW]. 
 195 Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 5; see also Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra 
note 68, at 2 (“These Chinese scholars may serve as collectors—wittingly or unwittingly—of 
economic, scientific, and technological intelligence from U.S. institutions to ultimately benefit 
Chinese academic institutions and businesses.”). 
 196 Adam S. Hickey, Press Release, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. of the Nat’l Sec. Div., 
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the Fifth National Conference on CFIUS and Team Telecom 
(Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-adam-
s-hickey-national-security-division-delivers-0 [https://perma.cc/KR8T-EZ5P]. 
 197 JASON, FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH SECURITY, JSR-19-2I, at 2 (Dec. 11, 2019) 
https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=299700 [https://perma.cc/9CPT-L87F]. 
JASON is an elite science advisory group that has been providing analysis to the U.S. 
government since 1960. See Ann Finkbeiner, Jason—a Secretive Group of Cold War Science 
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“Chinese government” in the U.S. academic sector that “[t]he scale and scope 
of the problem remain poorly defined, and academic leadership, faculty, and 
front-line government agencies lack a common understanding of foreign 
influence in U.S. fundamental research, the possible risks derived from it, 
and the possible detrimental effect of restrictions on it that might be enacted 
in response.” A November 2019 Senate report noted that “[u]niversity 
officials also described the FBI’s outreach on the threat that China poses as 
‘haphazard’ and or a ‘mixed bag.’”198 These observations were preceded by 
a raft of statements by academic institutions expressing concern over how the 
DOJ’s focus on PRC nationals was impacting their communities, a sampling 
of which follow: 
• A February 21, 2019, statement by the Berkeley leadership: “At 
a time when national security issues involving foreign countries 
make the front pages of our newspapers, it is critical that we not 
become any less welcoming to students, staff, faculty, visiting 
scholars, and other members of our community who come from 
those countries, or for whom those countries are an ancestral 
home.”199 
• A May 23, 2019, statement by the President of Yale University: 
“In recent weeks, tensions in United States-China relations and 
increased scrutiny of academic exchanges have added to a sense 
of unease among many international students and scholars here 
at Yale and at universities across the country. I write now to 
affirm Yale’s steadfast commitment to our international 
students and scholars; they are vital to the university 
community.”200 
• An August 12, 2019, statement by twenty-two organizations 
(e.g., Association of American Colleges and Universities, the 
Chinese American Citizens Alliance, and PEN America) 
 
Advisers—is Fighting to Survive in the 21st Century, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
SCI. (June 27, 2019, 1:30 PM) https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/06/jason-secretive-
group-cold-war-science-advisers-fighting-survive-21st-century [https://perma.cc/Z6P7-
CUKT]. 
 198 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 108, at 97–98. 
 199 Carol Christ, Paul Alivisatos, & Randy Katz, Reaffirming our Support for Berkeley’s 
International Community, BERKELEY NEWS (Feb. 21, 2019) https://news.berkeley.edu
/2019/02/21/reaffirming-our-support-for-berkeleys-international-community/ 
[https://perma.cc/LN86-V3QS]. 
 200 Paul Salovey, Yale’s Steadfast Commitment to our International Students and Scholars 
(May 23, 2019), YALE UNIV. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, https://president.yale.edu/yales-
steadfast-commitment-our-international-students-and-scholars [https://perma.cc/MN2C-
FR7T]. 
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raising concerns about the FBI’s outreach on campuses and 
cautioning that “calls to monitor individuals solely based on 
their country of origin violate norms of due process and should 
raise alarms in a democracy.”201 
• An August 30, 2019, op-ed by the President of Columbia 
University: “The FBI has stepped up its scrutiny of research 
practices at college and university campuses . . . .[M]ost 
worrisome to me, as someone who has spent five decades 
advocating freedom of expression and assembly, is the notion 
that university personnel—and perhaps students themselves—
should be asked to monitor the movements of foreign-born 
students and colleagues. This is antithetical to who we are.”202 
• An October 10, 2019, statement by the University of Michigan 
leadership affirming that, despite heightened scrutiny around 
potential international conflicts of interest, “not for a moment 
are we going to diminish our commitment to being a welcoming 
place for students and faculty from all around the world.”203 
• A November 7, 2019, statement by UCLA’s Office of the 
Chancellor noting concerns about potential theft of intellectual 
property but warning that “we must never resort to suspicion 
based on a person’s national origin. To do so is nothing short of 
discrimination, which is antithetical to our values as an 
institution. Racial profiling, in any context, is corrosive to our 
community.”204 
 
 201 Statement in Response to Report the FBI is Urging Universities to Monitor Chinese 
Students and Scholars, PEN AM. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://pen.org/fbi-universities-monitoring-
chinese-students/ [https://perma.cc/JEZ9-XVKK]. 
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Throughout these statements runs the concern for “othering”205: that 
people bearing PRC nationality or of PRC national origin will be branded as 
outside and even antagonistic to what is “American.” A concern for othering 
of foreigners by law enforcement authorities is not new,206 but the us–our 
versus them–their rhetoric has taken on a sharper tone particularly with 
respect to “Chinese” in contrast to “Americans.” After noting that 
“international students and professors” contribute to the U.S. academic vigor, 
the FBI’s publication titled “China: The Risk to Academia,” adds, 
“[h]owever, this open environment also puts academia at risk for exploitation 
by foreign actors who do not follow our rules or share our values.”207 The 
publication asserts that the PRC and its academics engage in “endemic 
plagiarism”: “Many recent high-profile examples show plagiarism is 
commonplace throughout Chinese academic and research institutions.”208 
This is in contrast to the DOJ’s depiction of American values: “Innovation in 
aviation has been a hallmark of life and industry in the United States since 
the Wright brothers first designed gliders in Dayton more than a century 
ago . . . . U.S. aerospace companies invest decades of time and billions of 
dollars in research. This is the American way. In contrast, according to the 
indictment, a Chinese intelligence officer tried to acquire that same, hard-
earned innovation through theft.”209 
The contrast of American versus Chinese is further apparent in the U.S. 
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by the DOJ in its presentations on the China Initiative includes the 
“[n]ationality of the world’s 10 largest companies, according to annual 
Forbes Global 2000 list,” using national flags to show shifts from 2004 to 
2018.211 In 2004, the composition was seven U.S. companies, two British 
companies, and one Japanese company.212 In 2019, there were four U.S. 
companies, one Dutch company, and four PRC companies.213 The stark 
categories are also reflected in statements. John Demers testified in 
December 2018 that, “[i]n all of these cases, China’s strategy is the same: 
rob, replicate, and replace. Rob the American company of its intellectual 
property, replicate the technology, and replace the American company in the 
Chinese market and, one day, the global market.”214 One of the “goals of the 
China Initiative” is to “Identify Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases 
involving Chinese companies that compete unfairly against U.S. 
businesses.”215 
The “Chinese” versus “American” company binary is explicit in the FBI 
publication titled, “China: The Risk to Corporate America,” which includes 
advice on “Combating Foreign Adversaries’ Tactics to Target Your 
Company”: “To address the potential vulnerability foreigner visits to 
company facilities can present, keep visitor groups together . . . .”216 This 
section is written in country-neutral terms, but it is still nested within a 
publication explicitly on the “China” threat. This framing not only presents 
“Corporate America” as a discrete entity, but also depicts the threat as 
specifically emanating from China. 
Other times the us-versus-them contrast is expressed in terms of 
“western” and “Chinese,” with William Evanina referring to “a Western 
civilization company.”217 At the same February 2020 conference, FBI 
Director Wray described how “China has grown its economy rapidly by 
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2021] CRIMINALIZING CHINA 187 
Although corporations have not become so multinational as to 
completely shed associations with any one country, the labeling of 
companies as Chinese or Western is an oversimplification. Take Lenovo, for 
example: in 2005, the PRC-based company (formerly “Legend”) acquired 
IBM’s Personal Computing Division making it the “third-largest personal 
computing company in the world.”219 Today, Lenovo is headquartered in 
Hong Kong with operational centers in North Carolina, Beijing, and 
Singapore.220 Or Monsanto, a former American company at the center of a 
high-profile economic espionage case involving the PRC, that Bayer, a 
company based in Germany, purchased in 2016.221 Was it still “Western” and 
thus of heightened importance to U.S. national security? Robert Mo (Mo 
Hailong), a PRC national, was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in 
2016 after pleading guilty to a conspiracy to steal trade secrets: “Mo Hailong 
stole valuable proprietary information in the form of seed corn from DuPont 
Pioneer and Monsanto in an effort to transport such trade secrets to 
China . . . . The theft of agricultural trade secrets, and other intellectual 
property, poses a grave threat to our national economic security.”222 The shift 
of Monsanto’s status from “ours” to “Germany’s” by virtue of corporate 
ownership did not change that Monsanto continued to have significant 
intellectual property situated in the United States. 
The American Chamber of Commerce in China allows resident (i.e., 
“legally registered in the US and China”) and nonresident (i.e., “legally 
registered in the US and not in China”) corporate members.223 And the U.S.-
China Business Council’s membership criteria provides, “[f]oreign 
companies with one or more offices incorporated in the United States may 
also be eligible, but are approved for membership on a caseby-case [sic] 
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basis.”224 It is too simplistic to express the identity and loyalty of companies 
with national flags. 
Certainly, some companies are directly under the control of the PRC 
party-state, most obviously if they are traditional state-owned enterprises. 
Less direct ties can also leave a company vulnerable to party-state influence. 
Curtis Milhaupt and Wentong Zheng describe “the dynamics of capture in 
the Chinese economy” as follows: “[F]irms of all ownership types face a 
choice: Grow and prosper by nestling up to the state and demonstrating the 
capacity to deliver on key party-state objectives, or seek autonomy from the 
state and risk being marginalized.”225 The Council on Foreign Relations 
explains, “[t]he government has considerable sway over Chinese private 
companies through heavy regulation.”226 But the report adds, “Huawei has 
distanced itself from the CCP, repeatedly asserting that its equipment has 
never been used, and will never be used, to spy.”227 Tim Rühlig in his May 
2020 paper titled, “Who Controls Huawei?” analyzes Huawei’s complex 
governance structure and cautions, “[i]t is likely that the Chinese party-state 
controls Huawei to such an extent that it could leverage technological 
dependencies to obtain political concessions.”228 The fine-grained analysis 
that Dr. Rühlig goes through to reach this point underscores the complicated 
relationships between companies and the PRC party-state.229 
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The U.S. government’s charges against Huawei may well eventually be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.230 But the framing is presented as a 
sweeping battle with “China” rather than a targeted prosecution against a 
specific company. A week before the February 2020 announcement of a 
superseding indictment against Huawei, Attorney General Barr warned, 
“[w]ithin the next five years, 5G global territory and application dominance 
will be determined. The question is whether . . . the United States and our 
allies can mount sufficient competition to Huawei to retain and capture 
enough market share to sustain the kind of long-term and robust competitive 
position necessary to avoid surrendering dominance to China.”231 He added, 
“[a]s a dictatorship, China can marshal an all-nation approach—the 
government, its companies, its academia, acting together as one.”232 
C. CHINESE ETHNICITY 
In the 1880s, prosecutors charged Yick Wo, an immigrant from then 
Qing-Dynasty China, with violating a San Francisco ordinance when he 
continued to operate his laundromat after the city denied his permit.233 The 
Supreme Court concluded that this was a selective prosecution aimed at a 
Chinese-owned business.234 Justice Matthews wrote, “[t]he rights of the 
petitioners, as affected by the proceedings of which they complain, are not 
less, because they are aliens and subjects of the Emperor of China.”235 
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Huawei and Subsidiaries Charged in Racketeering Conspiracy and Conspiracy to Steal Trade 
Secrets (Feb. 13. 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-conglo
merate-huawei-and-subsidiaries-charged-racketeering [https://perma.cc/774M-FJLK] (“The 
charges in the superseding indictment are allegations, and the defendants are presumed 
innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.”). The 
charges against Huawei are further notable for illustrating the potential overlap of criminal 
and civil penalties for intellectual-property theft. See Huawei Pleads Not Guilty to 
Racketeering in Beefed-Up U.S. Case, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2020, 2:07 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-03-04/huawei-pleads-not-guilty-to-
racketeering [https://perma.cc/CL2H-QV54] (“Huawei has said the new accusations rest on 
‘recycled civil disputes from the last 20 years that have been previously settled, litigated, and 
in some cases, rejected by federal judges and juries.’”). 
 231 Barr, supra note 4. 
 232 Id. 
 233 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 357 (1886). 
 234 See id. at 362 (“The necessary tendency, if not the specific purpose, of this ordinance, 
and of enforcing it in the manner indicated in the record, is to drive out of business all the 
numerous small laundries, especially those owned by Chinese . . . .”). The case is still taught 
today as an important example of a prosecution being struck down as impermissibly based on 
ethnicity/race. See, e.g., MARC L. MILLER, RONALD F. WRIGHT, JENIA I. TURNER & KAY L. 
LEVINE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION 182 (6th ed. 2019). 
 235 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368. 
190 LEWIS [Vol. 111 
Over a century later, the DOJ’s conception of a “China” threat 
encompasses nationality, as discussed in Part II.B, as well as people who are 
ethnically Chinese, whether or not they actually have any ties to the PRC.236 
In “China: The Risk to Academia,” the FBI’s first example of a “technique” 
that “foreign adversaries” might use to access information via academics is 
“[a]ppeals to ethnicity or nationality (for example, common ethnic heritage 
or dual-citizenship).”237 
Simultaneously, the DOJ has reassured that it is not focusing on people 
because of their nationality or ethnicity. John Brown, the assistant director 
of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division stated in November 2019, “I 
cannot overstate that ethnicity plays no role in our investigations. Instead, we 
follow facts and evidence wherever they lead.”238 He reiterated in February 
2020, “[w]e are not focused on the Chinese people as a whole . . . we’re 
focused on those committing crimes and conducting intelligence activities 
for communist China.”239 William Evanina similarly stressed in February 
2020, “[w]e hear a lot of pushback in the government about this as a racial 
issue. Totally disagree. This is a fact-based issue of the theft of intellectual 
property, trade secrets, and ideas by a communist country.”240 
One challenge in untangling when the rhetoric surrounding the China 
Initiative refers to nationality as compared with ethnicity is linguistic. 
“Chinese” is commonly used when referring both to nationality and ethnicity. 
For example, an October 30, 2018, DOJ press release explained how 
“Chinese actors” used hacking methods, and then in the next sentence 
referred to “two Chinese nationals.”241 In Mandarin Chinese, by contrast, the 
phrasing for Chinese ethnicity (hua ren) and PRC nationality (zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo guomin) are distinct. That it requires more disciplined 
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phrasing to express these two concepts in English does not relieve the speaker 
from taking steps to do so. 
The blurring of nationality and ethnicity stretches far before the China 
Initiative. Recent requests under the Freedom of Information Act unearthed 
that the Hoover-era FBI “singled out Chinese American scientists because of 
their ethnicity—and that it did so even after the Senate’s Church Committee, 
formed in 1975, exposed some of the most egregious intelligence abuses of 
the era . . . .”242 More recently, Congressman Ted Lieu cautioned in 2015 that 
“one of their issues that our federal government has had is inability of our 
government to realize the distinction between a foreign national and an 
American citizen who happens to be of Asian-American descent.”243 
There are many people who are ethnically Han Chinese but have no ties 
to the PRC.244 Associating “Han Chinese” with a threat emanating from the 
PRC party-state is overinclusive. Take for example Wen Ho Lee, a Taiwan-
born naturalized U.S. citizen, who was charged in 1999 with selling 
information about the United States’ nuclear program to the PRC 
government.245 After nearly a year in solitary confinement, a federal judge 
accepted his plea on a single count and stated, “Dr. Lee, I tell you with great 
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sadness that I feel I was led astray last December by the executive branch of 
our government through its Department of Justice . . . .”246 In 2006, Dr. Lee 
obtained a $1.645 million settlement from the U.S. Government for “leaks 
disseminated to the press by government officials during the investigation of 
security lapses at Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1990s . . . .”247 The 
case also prompted self-reflection by the media with the New York Times 
largely standing behind its reporting but noting, among other points, “[w]e 
never prepared a full-scale profile of Dr. Lee, which might have humanized 
him and provided some balance.”248 
The case against Dr. Lee and the surrounding reporting was flawed. Yet 
there was truth that he had access to nuclear secrets and that he had contacts 
with foreign visitors, including from the PRC.249 This combination was 
reason to have him, and all other people in comparable positions, subject to 
tight protocols. What is interesting about Dr. Lee’s case is how ethnicity 
played a central role. He is ethnically Han Chinese but was born in Taiwan 
under Japanese rule.250 His ethnicity only connects him to the PRC by virtue 
of historical ties that far predate the PRC’s founding. Likewise, today the 
vast majority of Taiwan’s population is ethnically Han Chinese,251 but their 
identity is distinct—and increasingly so—from that of people in the PRC.252 
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Beyond Taiwan, there is an expansive ethnically-Han diaspora that reaches 
around the world and is, to varying degrees, distinct from—and sometimes 
even antagonistic to—the PRC.253 
Nevertheless, the DOJ’s rhetoric conflates ethnicity with the “China” of 
the “China Initiative.” In a February 2020 interview, Andrew Lelling, U.S. 
Attorney for the District of Massachusetts, explained, “[t]he bottom line is 
that this is an effort by a rival nation state to steal U.S. technology . . . And 
that rival nation is made up almost exclusively of Han Chinese. And so, 
unfortunately, a lot of our targets are going to be Han Chinese. If it were the 
French government targeting U.S. technology, we’d be looking for 
Frenchmen.”254 There is truth that the overwhelming majority of PRC 
citizens are Han Chinese. And U.S. Attorney Lelling’s argument fits our 
current era of risk assessment tools in so far as that a person who is a 
“Frenchman” by virtue of nationality or ethnicity is statistically less likely to 
have ties to the PRC party-state than a person who is ethnically Han Chinese. 
This risk-assessment mode was explicit in remarks by the Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General of the National Security Division regarding the China 
Initiative and foreign investment in the United States: “While there is a 
presumption of innocence in the criminal context, we are here today as risk 
managers, not criminal lawyers.”255 U.S. Attorney Lelling’s remarks 
highlight the blurring of these “risk manager” and “criminal lawyer” roles.  
As risk assessment tools have been embraced in areas of criminal justice 
outside of the China Initiative, they have also fallen under increasing scrutiny 
for being “ineffective, inaccurate and perpetuat[ing] the well-documented 
bias in the criminal justice system against low-income people and people of 
color.”256 The unearthing of a 2017 FBI memo on the rise of a “black identity 
extremist” movement generated criticism that the FBI was “reverting to the 
surveillance and sabotage of black activists that had defined its activities in 
the civil rights era.”257 Equating ethnicity with an enhanced risk of criminal 
conduct linked to the PRC party-state risks repeating these mistakes. 
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A study of economic espionage cases from 1997 to 2015 that coded for 
people of Chinese descent in part based on last names of defendants258 found 
that, “[f]rom 1997 to 2009, 17% of defendants charged under the [Economic 
Espionage Act] were of Chinese descent while an additional 9% were Other 
Asians. After 2009, however, the percentage of Chinese espionage 
defendants tripled to 52% while the rate for Other Asians remained at 9%.”259 
However, “this Study cannot rule out the possibility that Chinese-Americans 
are simply committing three times as much espionage today as they did prior 
to 2009.”260 Further challenging an empirical analysis is prosecutorial 
discretion with respect to charging decisions and resolution via guilty pleas: 
few cases go to trial and, for those defendants who plead guilty, it is 
sometimes to lesser charges.261 Moreover, that an investigation does not 
result in charges—or that charges are dropped before trial—is not standing 
alone evidence of discrimination. There are a myriad of reasons why a 
prosecutor might decide not to pursue a case. What is difficult to glean from 
the outside are the motivations behind decisions related to investigating and 
prosecuting cases.262 In sum, the study is worrisome but inconclusive. 
Similarly, information released by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in 
June 2020 showed that the PRC was the source of undisclosed support “[f]or 
93% of the 189 scientists whom NIH has investigated,” and 82% of those 
people investigated were Asian.263 Whether these numbers are proportionate 
to the actual number of scientists who have undisclosed financial support 
from the PRC party-state is, however, unknown. 
Accordingly, this Article is not making an empirical claim that the DOJ 
is actually investigating or prosecuting people of PRC nationality, Chinese 
ethnicity, or both at a higher rate than people of other nationalities or 
ethnicities who are equivalently situated (e.g., researchers with similar access 
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to intellectual property and similar indicators of potential legal violations). 
We simply do not have the data to prove or disprove such a claim. 
What this Article is arguing is that the DOJ has framed the China 
Initiative in a manner that expresses the U.S. government’s conclusion that 
people exhibiting China-ness are an enhanced threat and that message is 
being reiterated by officials charged with leading the Initiative. If you go 
looking for people who are ethnically Chinese and have committed crimes, 
you will in all likelihood find some. But that does not clarify the prevalence 
of people who are ethnically Chinese among the population committing those 
crimes. You also risk increasing the chances that people who have not 
committed crimes, but who are ethnically Chinese, will be subject to 
heightened scrutiny. 
In a February 2020 letter to the FBI, members of the House of 
Representatives’ Committee on Oversight and Reform wrote “to request 
information about counterintelligence efforts of the [FBI] that reportedly 
target ethnically Chinese scientists. There are certainly authentic and 
legitimate cases of espionage that should be investigated. However, 
according to news reports, the FBI has arrested and charged many Chinese-
American scientists who have turned out to be innocent.”264 In March 2020, 
Asian Americans Advancing Justice and the ACLU “filed a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request for all records from six federal agencies 
pertaining to the government’s efforts to scrutinize, investigate, and 
prosecute U.S.-based scientists and researchers perceived to have 
connections to China.”265 And organizations such as the Society of Chinese 
Bioscientists in America are conducting seminars with titles like, “What to 
Do When Your University, FBI, or DOJ Knocks on Your Door: Responding 
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to University, Criminal, and Civil, and Investigations,” to address concerns 
of PRC-nationals and Chinese-American scientists.266 
Just because some of the people prosecuted under the China Initiative 
are Caucasian, U.S. citizens does not cleanse the Initiative of these concerns. 
As explained by L. Rafael Reif, President of Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, “faculty members, post-docs, research staff and students tell me 
that, in their dealings with government agencies, they now feel unfairly 
scrutinized, stigmatized and on edge—because of their Chinese ethnicity 
alone. Nothing could be further from—or more corrosive to—our 
community’s collaborative strength and open-hearted ideals.”267 Pointing to 
prosecutions of people who do not present as ethnically Chinese is an 
insufficient response to this stigma. 
Concerns about an overinclusive framing of a threat also expand beyond 
the government and bleed into the general public. In her dissenting opinion 
to a 2018 report on PRC party-state influence in the United States, Susan 
Shirk cautioned that “overstating the threat of subversion from China risks 
causing overreactions reminiscent of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, 
including an anti-Chinese version of the Red Scare that would put all ethnic 
Chinese under a cloud of suspicion.”268 That the novel coronavirus COVID-
19 originated in the PRC has further heightened concerns about the 
stigmatization of people who display some form of China-ness: “On college 
campuses, at a music conservatory, in Chinese restaurants, among the ranks 
of a famous dance troupe and on streets every day, Asians have reported a 
rise in aggression, micro and macro.”269 Former presidential candidate 
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Andrew Yang wrote in April 2020 regarding increasing anti-Asian American 
sentiments, “[w]e Asian Americans need to embrace and show our 
American-ness in ways we never have before.”270 While his prescription 
prompted vigorous debate,271 what is clear is that sensitivity as to how the 
China Initiative equates ethnicity with enhanced threat is needed now more 
than ever.272 Eric Dreiband, the former Assistant Attorney General for Civil 
Rights, was spot on when he wrote in April 2020, that “the coronavirus 
originated in China, and some people have targeted Asian Americans and 
Asians simply because of their ethnicity. This conduct has no place in 
America.”273 
D. ACQUIRED CHINA-NESS 
The “China” in the China Initiative has spilled over beyond meaning the 
PRC party-state to encompass nationality, national origin, and ethnicity. 
China-ness can further attach to people whose passports and DNA have no 
connection to the PRC. China-ness can be acquired. 
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In August 2019, reports surfaced of the FBI questioning several 
American graduates of Yenching Academy in Beijing.274 Though this 
questioning might have been for well-grounded reasons, Rebecca Arcesati 
pointed out that the limited information about the FBI’s contacts with 
American students “may discourage young talents from participating in these 
academic exchanges, and even jeopardize people’s careers.”275 Especially for 
students considering a career requiring security clearances, contacts that are 
necessary to understand the PRC can also run the risk of creating an 
impression of being too close to “China.” That the DOJ press releases for the 
espionage convictions of Kevin Patrick Mallory and Ron Rockwell Hansen 
included that they “speak[] fluent Mandarin Chinese”276 prompts the 
question why their linguistic abilities were noteworthy enough for the press 
releases. 
Dragon-slayer and panda-hugger have long been tropes for differences 
among foreign experts on the PRC.277 At a time when “engagement” with the 
PRC is viewed with an increasingly skeptical eye,278 the path to interact with 
entities in the PRC without being labeled a naïve panda-hugger is likewise 
increasingly fraught. If engagement becomes conflated with complicity—a 
panda-helper as well as hugger—it risks pushing Americans to establish bona 
fides as “tough on China” to ameliorate concerns about their loyalties. 
American experts on the PRC should be tough on the PRC party-state if their 
analysis leads them to that conclusion, not because of the need to signal 
loyalties to the home team. It bears remembering that President Richard 
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Nixon, who normalized relations with the PRC, “arguably was the only U.S. 
politician who could have gotten away with such a bold move. He had the 
right-wing credentials, as an anti-communist and advocate of Taiwan.”279 
The DOJ’s depictions of non-ethnically Chinese, non-PRC citizens 
further creates tropes of formerly law-abiding Americans being seduced by 
slick PRC operatives who appeal to greed.280 The 2014 FBI film, “Game of 
Pawns,” has a White protagonist who is recruited by PRC operatives to seek 
a position with the CIA.281 “The Company Man” also dramatizes a White 
protagonist who is lured by money from PRC nationals.282 Depicting people 
who do not present as ethnically Chinese as pawns does not diminish 
concerns about the framing of a China threat but rather creates another layer: 
that part of the DOJ’s narrative is the presence of a stealthy “China” operating 
behind the scenes and corrupting Americans. There are ways to construct 
briefings for the business community and predeparture seminars for 
American students headed abroad that alert them to concerns—ranging from 
possible recruitment as spies to compliance with the country’s drug laws—
without stoking fears or stereotypes. 
When announcing charges against a “Harvard University Professor and 
Two Chinese Nationals” in January 2020, the FBI Special Agent in charge 
remarked, “[a]ll three individuals charged today are manifestations of the 
China threat.”283 This “China” of the China Initiative has become an “it” 
with, as described by Attorney General Barr, a bold historical and current 
ambition: “Centuries before communism, China regarded itself as the central 
kingdom, Zhongguo. And it wasn’t central to the region. It was central to the 
world. And its ambition today is not to be a regional power, but a global 
one.”284 
Operating within a framework that is seen as countering China’s 
ambition muddles the individualized lens through which federal prosecutors 
should approach a decision whether to commence prosecution: the belief 
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“that a person’s conduct constitutes a federal offense.”285 Not only is an 
associational stigma attaching to persons exhibiting China-ness, this framing 
is in tension with fundamental principles undergirding why the DOJ should 
seek to prove criminal liability and recommend punishment. 
IV. PUNISHING CHINA 
With the China Initiative giving shape to a China threat that spans 
government, party, nationality, ethnicity, and even broader contacts, the 
question is then whether this is a good thing. If the perspective is a blunt 
national security assessment that there are threats emanating from the PRC 
party-state and it is better to err heavily on the side of being overinclusive, 
then the U.S. government can try to make this case. For instance, the U.S. 
government argued during the post-9/11 “war on terror” that laws against 
torture should bend to national security concerns.286 The DOJ is not making 
this case. Rather, it is positioning the China Initiative as appropriately 
striking the balance between being wary of the PRC party-state while not 
unfairly encompassing people who have some sort of ties to “China.” 
If we shift the perspective from a national security assessment to how 
we understand the traditional drivers behind prosecutions, then a different 
analysis is warranted. The DOJ has tremendous power to prosecute 
individuals such that, if convicted, they will be subject to punishment.287 
What are the guiding principles for prosecutors and how does the China 
Initiative stand up when evaluated against these principles? 
This Part takes questions usually focused on individual defendants (e.g., 
how might prosecuting this person deter potential criminal conduct?) and 
also asks them of the China Initiative as a whole (e.g., how might the China 
Initiative deter potential criminal conduct?). It argues that having prosecution 
 
 285 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 25, at 9-27.220 (emphasis added). 
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and punishment rest in part on a connection with “China” is worrisome when 
assessed in light of the goals of deterrence (Part IV.A), incapacitation (Part 
IV.B), rehabilitation (Part IV.C), and retribution (Part IV.D). 
Based on this assessment, a better path is for the DOJ to discard the 
China Initiative framing, focus on cases’ individual characteristics, and draw 
on outside expertise so that removing the initiative’s name is accompanied 
by real changes in practice (Part IV.E). 
A. DETERRENCE 
A slide in a DOJ presentation on the China Initiative lists reasons “Why 
Prosecutions Matter,”288 including “[d]eter others (change cost-benefit 
calculation of leadership and thieves/hackers).”289 Deterrence is thus 
presented on two levels: the individual human level (the “thieves/hackers”) 
and the PRC party-state level (the “leadership”). 
Deterrence is a central pillar of a utilitarian view of punishment.290 Put 
simply, punishing the individual has benefits for society as a whole. 
Reducing the future prevalence, severity, or both of criminal activities can 
occur on the individual level (i.e., specific deterrence)291 or more broadly in 
society (i.e., general deterrence).292 An unshakeable challenge of deterrence 
theory, whether specific or general, is that we cannot prove in practice what 
we hope is the case in theory.293 Research has shown that the probability of 
detection, prosecution, and punishment are factors in achieving deterrence, 
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as compared with focusing solely on the severity of punishment.294 That 
people regularly depart from being rational actors further complicates the 
equation.295 
Beginning on the individual level, decreasing recidivism of people 
charged as part of the China Initiative does not appear to be a central 
motivation. Once a person has been exposed for stealing intellectual property 
or failing to disclose ties to the PRC, it is unlikely—absent a serious lapse in 
a company’s or university’s due diligence—that she would once again be 
allowed in a position with the access required to commit a similar offense. 
Accordingly, punishing a person who engaged in intellectual-property theft 
or made false statements today does not seem necessary to stop future 
transgressions by the same person. Experiencing punishment could well give 
such person pause before reengaging in similar conduct for fear of future 
punishment, but other external barriers kick in that do not apply, for example, 
if a person who is punished for burglary is again out in public with easy 
access to homes. 
The China Initiative is instead aimed at general deterrence. It seeks to 
discourage possible offenders from committing crimes in the first place out 
of fear that they will face a similar end as defendants like Dr. Lieber.296 Such 
an example could deter someone who has already engaged in illegal behavior 
(e.g., lying about connections to the PRC party-state or even currently 
stealing intellectual property) to cease those activities. It could also raise 
awareness among people who are leading completely crime-free lives that 
connections with the PRC party-state should be done with caution and that, 
“[w]hile association with a Talent Program is not illegal, it can create 
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incentives to steal, violate export controls, or cause a failure to disclose 
conflicts of interest/foreign funding.”297 
The “failure to disclose conflicts” component of the China Initiative 
deserves emphasis because it sweeps in a much broader range of potential 
defendants than crimes that are more blatantly nefarious like stealing a 
competitor’s robot technology. The DOJ’s “Justice Manual,” which contains 
essential guidance for prosecutors, includes as a reason not to commence 
prosecution that “there exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to 
prosecution.”298 Casting a wide net of criminal charges chafes against this 
constraint. If increased auditing and transparency requirements could achieve 
the same or similar deterrence of misbehavior, then perhaps a harsh response 
using criminal laws is overkill. 
The DOJ has taken the stance that criminal prosecutions play a 
beneficial role. For example, Andrew Lelling said in February 2020 of letters 
from the NIH to grantee institutions with questionable contacts in the PRC, 
“I think those letters have had an in terrorem effect . . . .  And that’s good, 
because you want a little bit of fear out there to sensitize people to the 
magnitude of the problem.”299 The high-profile prosecutions and push to 
reach the corporate and academic worlds through briefings certainly heighten 
awareness of the threats that the China Initiative seeks to mitigate.300 As 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated in 1881, “[p]revention would . . . seem to 
be the chief and only universal purpose of punishment.”301 
What deserves greater scrutiny is whether the China Initiative is 
creating overdeterrence. Also in February 2020, Andrew Lelling explained 
that “[t]he primary goal of the China Initiative is to sensitize private industry 
and academic institutions to this problem [of intellectual-property theft 
connected to the PRC]” and that academic institutes might think harder about 
collaboration with PRC-linked entities in the future.302 When asked if this 
approach would have a chilling effect on collaboration with Chinese entities, 
he responded, “Yes, it will.”303 In April 2020, Politico reported that George 
Varghese, a former Assistant U.S. Attorney and current partner at 
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WilmerHale, “said the China Initiative has made some of his clients in 
academia rethink their overall approach to working with foreign partners.”304 
An appraisal of the pros and cons of this chilling effect would benefit 
from eyes beyond the DOJ. At present, the China Initiative outreach appears 
centered on entities that could become victims of, or accomplices to, crimes. 
Efforts to quantify the benefits of connectivity between the United States and 
PRC—including the flow of people, information, and money—are needed to 
better calibrate when deterrence could place the United States in a worse 
competitive position vis-à-vis the PRC. As an example of how outside 
expertise could be valuable in this process, in June 2020, MacroPolo 
launched a “Global AI Talent Tracker,” with a key takeaway that “China is 
the largest source of top-tier AI researchers, but a majority of these Chinese 
researchers leave China to study, work, and live in the United States.”305 In 
July 2020, Attorney General Barr warned of the PRC’s advances in AI, 
adding “[w]hichever nation emerges as the global leader in AI will be best 
positioned to unlock not only its considerable economic potential, but a range 
of military applications, such as the use of computer vision to gather 
intelligence.”306 Yet an overzealous China Initiative could actually impede 
the United States’ prospects for emerging as this global leader. 
An additional level of outreach would be to involve criminologists who 
are skilled at trying to disentangle the forces behind deterrence. Because 
deterrence is impossible to measure precisely, even close coordination 
between the DOJ and independent criminologists is unlikely to yield an 
agreed upon sweet spot whereby crimes are deterred while productive 
collaboration continues. It is no easy feat to stop hackers from grabbing 
COVID-19 research—as announced in a July 2020 indictment307—while also 
encouraging cross-border scientific partnerships to find a vaccine. But 
working with criminologists could shine at least some light on the ways in 
which the initiative might squelch collaboration that could benefit the United 
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States’ economic health as well as, in the age of COVID-19, its citizens’ 
actual physical health.308 
Avoiding altogether the expansive China threat as currently depicted by 
the DOJ requires that researchers steer clear of an array of people and entities 
with some connection to the PRC. Although it is true that the PRC party-state 
reaches into companies and universities within the PRC in a far deeper and 
wider manner than does the U.S. government in the United States, this does 
not meld the party-state, business world, and academia into a monolithic 
entity. Nor do all parts of PRC universities raise national security concerns. 
For instance, in April 2019, the U.S. government added Renmin University 
and Tongji University, two prestigious PRC universities, to the “unverified 
list” used as part of the government’s system for export controls.309 The list 
does not look at those universities on a granular level, meaning discussions 
on criminal justice reforms with Renmin’s law school are subject to enhanced 
concern along with areas like the physics department, which is much more 
likely to house sensitive technologies. 
A related issue that has not been adequately explored is that the China 
Initiative might not only deter productive exchanges that would benefit U.S. 
innovation but perhaps encourage the very problem that the China Initiative 
was created to address. The utilitarian goal of deterrence is rooted in the 
premise that “[c]riminal penalties should not cost more than the benefits they 
achieve or cause individual or social harms which outweigh their crime-
controlling effects or other benefits.”310 The FBI warns of “[a]ppeals to 
ethnicity or nationality (for example, common ethnic heritage or dual 
citizenship)” as a technique used by the PRC party-state to enlist the 
assistance of academics.311 If these appeals are actually working—a point 
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that requires greater clarity—does the China Initiative make it easier for the 
PRC party-state to tap into nationalism?312 
In contrast to the carrots of money and accolades for assisting the PRC 
party-state, another question is how to address the sticks that the party-state 
can wield when people have familial or other close ties to the PRC.313 On the 
one hand, the potential for using family as leverage is real.314 It is a high bar 
for a defendant in federal court to prevail on a duress defense,315 though 
reported retaliation against family within the PRC of dissidents abroad raises 
concerns about how the PRC party-state might exploit vulnerabilities.316 
Even if not rising to such extreme pressure, the already murky calculation of 
deterrence is even more complicated when a person is weighing not just the 
potential for apprehension and punishment by U.S. authorities but also the 
concern that going against the PRC party-state could have negative 
repercussions for people they care about who are living in the PRC. 
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On the other hand, the mere fact that people have family ties to the PRC 
should not, standing alone, be reason for the U.S. government to consider a 
person untrustworthy. An example from the Defense Office of Hearings and 
Appeals (DOHA) is instructive even if not directly relevant to the DOJ. 
Based on an analysis of more than 26,000 security clearance decisions by 
DOHA from 1996 through October 2019, Bloomberg reported, “[t]he idea 
that having friends or family in China makes Chinese Americans vulnerable 
to coercion by Chinese agents, directly or through their loved ones, is a 
premise of most of DOHA’s China-linked denials. In [DOHA Judge Noreen] 
Lynch’s 12-page ruling, the word ‘coercion’ appears 11 times.”317 As the 
writer and physicist Yangyang Cheng has observed, “With their ethnicity 
appropriated by both governments, Chinese people in the U.S. are double-
victimized, by an overreaching ancestral homeland on one side of the Pacific 
and a paranoid Washington establishment on the other.”318 
Lumping people together because of a perceived shared China-ness 
diverts from the individualized focus that should be the centerpiece not only 
of criminal prosecutions but also of security decisions. A tendency toward 
categorical thinking of members of a group (e.g., based on race or ethnicity) 
can be mitigated by learning to individuate people, but this requires 
conscious work.319 It also requires time and resources to make more fine-
grained, individualized determinations rather than using proxies like 
ethnicity and nationality to estimate risks. 
In light of the multiple layers of influences on human behavior, the DOJ 
should seek to thread the needle of sensitizing academia and the private 
sector to the vulnerability of their intellectual property while not depicting 
the sources of that vulnerability in ways that alienates—and even 
aggravates—any entities that possess China-ness. To date, instead of trying 
to excise actors engaged in criminal conduct with a scalpel, the rhetoric 
surrounding the China Initiative indicates an intent to excavate any PRC-
linked influence. The Director of the National Counterintelligence and 
Security Center introduced a circular diagram of the “PRC’s Tools for 
Acquiring Technology” (ranging from “intelligence services” to “academic 
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collaboration” and “research partnerships”) by remarking, “[w]e call this the 
wheel of doom.”320 This rhetoric coupled with an emphasis on criminal 
prosecutions as a method for sending broad warnings means that the safe 
route is for researchers to avoid projects with links to the PRC. It also means 
that scientists who themselves possess China-ness may conclude that it is 
prudent to remain distant from the U.S. government and, at an extreme, even 
from the United States itself.321 Furthermore, the very people who best 
understand how the PRC party-state works and have the linguistic and 
cultural competencies to bring greater precision to the DOJ’s efforts are the 
same people who are swept within the description of the threat.322 
As noted above,323 DOJ officials intersperse reassurances that the China 
Initiative is not aimed at people because they are Chinese: “The FBI is now 
investigating China-related cases in all 50 states . . . . But let me be crystal 
clear: we are not suggesting that all, or even most, Chinese students and 
visitors are somehow up to no good.”324 Such statements do not remedy the 
problem. Vastly ramping up the scope and scale of investigations under the 
China Initiative speaks louder than words. Moreover, rote interjections 
denying that people who possess China-ness are under enhanced scrutiny act 
as microinvalidations.325 Intermittently telling people of PRC nationality, 
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Chinese ethnicity, or both that the China Initiative is not aimed at them 
invalidates their lived experience in the United States today. 
In addition to these concerns about how deterrence theory applies on the 
individual human level, the China Initiative is also concerning when viewed 
from its goal of deterring the larger entity of the PRC party-state. Criminal 
law deterrence theory is not generally thought in terms of changing the 
calculations of a government, yet, as FBI Director Wray stated at a February 
2020 conference on the China Initiative, “[w]e’ve seen how our criminal 
indictments have rallied other nations to our cause, which is crucial to 
persuading the Chinese government to change its behavior.”326 
Deterrence theory in the different context of international relations has 
a long history. Michael J. Mazarr at the Rand Corporation wrote in 2018, 
“[t]he challenge of deterrence—discouraging states from taking unwanted 
actions, especially military aggression—has again become a principal theme 
in U.S. defense policy.”327 In describing how various executive-branch 
agencies are part of the “whole-of-government push back against China,”328 
Satoru Mori notes how the U.S. government’s current approach toward the 
PRC is “based on the notion that inducements cannot bring about positive 
change in Chinese behavior and policy.”329 In other words, the U.S. 
government is putting greater emphasis on sticks (e.g., prosecutions) over 
carrots (e.g., friendly gestures of working together on protection of 
intellectual property). Not only is pursuing individual prosecutions as an 
attempt to change the behavior of the PRC party-state like using an ice pick 
to break up a glacier, scrutinizing individual criminal liability is 
fundamentally different from managing state-to-state relations. 
There is no indication that the PRC party-state leadership is reducing 
efforts to obtain intellectual property in violation of U.S. laws because 
individual people are being punished under the China Initiative. There are, 
however, intimations that the PRC is revising its own Criminal Law with the 
 
Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Implications for Clinical Practice, 62 AM. PSYCH. 271, 
274–75 (2007)] (“Microinvalidations are characterized by communications that exclude, 
negate, or nullify the psychological thoughts, feelings, or experiential reality of a person of 
color. When Asian Americans (born and raised in the United States) are complimented for 
speaking good English or are repeatedly asked where they were born, the effect is to negate 
their U.S. American heritage and to convey that they are perpetual foreigners.”). 
 326 Wray, supra note 4. 
 327 MICHAEL J. MAZARR, UNDERSTANDING DETERRENCE 1 (2018), https://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE295/RAND_PE295.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4XMB-WMW7]. 
 328 Satoru Mori, US Technological Competition with China: The Military, Industrial and 
Digital Network Dimensions, 26 ASIA-PAC. REV. 77, 78 (2019). 
 329 Id. at 79. 
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China Initiative in mind: amendments adopted in December 2020 include the 
possibility of five or more years’ imprisonment if “commercial secrets are 
stolen, spied upon, sold, or illegally provided to overseas institutions, 
organizations, or persons.”330 Mark Cohen at China IPR blog points out 
differences between this provision and “economic espionage” under U.S. law 
but explains how commentators have suggested the amendment is “a ‘tit for 
tat’ provision in retaliation for US economic espionage cases.”331 Ironically, 
the United States had previously pushed the PRC to increase criminal 
penalties for intellectual property infringements, as seen in a 2007 WTO 
complaint against the PRC.332 
If the argument is that prosecutions build solidarity with like-minded 
countries and then, in turn, the resulting multilateral effort (as compared with 
direct pressure by the United States alone) is what will deter PRC party-state 
directed crimes,333 then the DOJ should substantiate how that chain of 
influence is indeed happening. In his July 2020 speech on U.S. policy toward 
China, Secretary of State Pompeo proposed, “Maybe it’s time for a new 
grouping of like-minded nations, a new alliance of democracies.”334 Whether 
the now Biden administration can rally this grouping and have it change the 
PRC leadership’s behavior is yet to be clearly articulated let alone seen. 
Not only is an initiative aimed at deterring China through prosecuting 
individuals a departure from the DOJ’s usual work, the emphasis on China 
as the bad actor can create tunnel vision. When Mike Bloomberg entered the 
race for president, recordings surfaced of him defending his stop-and-frisk 
policy while New York City mayor: 
 
 330 P.R.C. Criminal Law Amendment 11, China Law Translate (Dec. 26, 2020), 
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/criminal-law-amendment-11/ [https://perma.cc/F2LP-
HGZ9]; Criminal Law Amendment (XI), NPC Observer (last visited Jan. 20, 2021), 
https://npcobserver.com/legislation/criminal-law-amendment-xi/ [https://perma.cc/F98C-
8J2D]. 
 331 Mark Cohen, Proposed Amendments to the Criminal Code on Trade Secrets, CHINA 
IPR (July 13, 2020), https://chinaipr.com/2020/07/13/proposed-amendments-to-the-criminal-
code-on-trade-secrets/ [https://perma.cc/P992-2EP4]. 
 332 See generally Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon is Over: Evaluating the U.S.-China 
WTO Intellectual Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 96, (2008) (evaluating U.S. 
complaint alleging the PRC violated its obligations under TRIPS to provide adequate 
protection for and deterrence against infringing intellectual property rights). 
 333 See Wray, supra note 4 (“We’ve seen how our criminal indictments have rallied other 
nations to our cause, which is crucial to persuading the Chinese government to change its 
behavior.”). 
 334 Pompeo, supra note 7. 
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[People say] “you are arresting kids for marijuana that are all minorities.” Yes, that’s 
true. Why? Because we put all the cops in minority neighborhoods. Yes, that’s true. 
Why do we do it? Because that’s where all the crime is.335 
By criminalizing China, the DOJ has similarly made a decision that 
resources should be directed at entities with China-ness because, “that’s 
where all the crime is.” John Demers reported in December 2018 that, 
“[f]rom 2011[–]2018, more than 90 percent of the Department’s cases 
alleging economic espionage by or to benefit a state involve China, and more 
than two-thirds of the Department’s theft of trade secrets cases have had a 
nexus to China.”336 To what extent is this percentage increasing now that 
resources are explicitly directed at a China threat?337 And to what extent are 
foreign governments other than the PRC aware that they are not the focus of 
the DOJ’s efforts?338 In short, is there underdeterrence of actors who do not 
have a nexus to the PRC? That in July 2020 Attorney General Barr provided 
the following, slightly different numbers without any mention of the time 
period covered underscores the need for greater clarity: “About 80% of all 
federal economic espionage prosecutions have alleged conduct that would 
benefit the Chinese state, and about 60% of all trade secret theft cases have 
had a nexus to China.”339 
To be sure, the DOJ can walk and chew gum at the same time. The 
China Initiative does not mean that DOJ has entirely taken its eye off other 
potential sources of threats. Nevertheless, constructing a massive initiative 
around a particularly defined threat will at least deflect some energy from 
other potential investigations. To justify the China Initiative framing based 
on a deterrence rationale requires the DOJ to demonstrate that it is not only 
 
 335 Elliot Hannon, Leaked Audio Captures Bloomberg Defending Racial Profiling and 
Stop-and-Frisk Policing, SLATE (Feb. 11, 2020, 10:13 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2020/02/leaked-audio-bloomberg-aspen-institute-racial-profiling-stop-and-frisk-
policing.html [https://perma.cc/QPT9-RDY4]. 
 336 Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 5. 
 337 Cf. 2018 Foreign Economic Espionage in CyberSpace, NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
& SEC. CTR. (July 26, 2018, 9:50 AM), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-newsroom/item/
1889-2018-foreign-economic-espionage-in-cyberspace [https://perma.cc/9F63-U2MK] 
(“The report also provides insights into the most pervasive nation-state threat actors – 
including China, Russia and Iran . . . .”); Dreyfuss & Lobel, supra note 51, at 422–23 (noting 
USTR watch list of countries included China, India, and Thailand). 
 338 Cf. Press release, U.S. Trade Rep., USTR Releases Annual Special 301 Report on 
Intellectual Property Protection and Review of Notorious Markets for Piracy and 
Counterfeiting (Apr. 25, 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2019/april/ustr-releases-annual-special-301 [https://perma.cc/Q2Y7-6GK4] 
(“Trading partners that currently present the most significant concerns regarding IP rights are 
placed on the Priority Watch List or Watch List. USTR identified 36 countries for these lists 
in the Special 301 Report . . . .”). 
 339 Barr, supra note 166. 
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effective in changing the behavior of the PRC leadership and individual 
“thieves/hackers,”340 but also that the downsides (e.g., potential 
overdeterrence of contacts with the PRC and underdeterrence of criminal 
activity without a nexus to the PRC) do not outweigh the upsides. 
B. INCAPACITATION 
A second pillar of utilitarian justifications for punishment is 
incapacitation.341 This logic is simple enough on an individual level: lock a 
person behind bars and he cannot, or at least it will be very difficult to, 
commit crimes outside of those bars. The benefits to society from increasing 
incarceration levels is, however, contested.342 Various degrees of 
incapacitation can also be achieved through restrictions on a person’s 
activities via electronic or other monitoring.343 
For the intellectual property thefts at the heart of the China Initiative, 
exposure is often tantamount to incapacitation. Keeping a person who has 
been accused of making false statements on research grants or stealing trade 
secrets away from opportunities to recommit similar crimes does not require 
prison. It requires transparent, accessible records such that anyone who is 
considering again putting that person in a position in which those crimes can 
occur simply will deny access.344 For example, Robert Mo was sentenced to 
thirty-six months in prison for conspiracy to steal trade secrets.345 Once his 
activities to obtain corn-seed technology were exposed, it became doubtful 
 
 340 U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 20. 
 341 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 17 (8th ed. 2018) (“Quite simply, 
[the defendant’s] imprisonment prevents him from committing crimes in the outside society 
during the period of segregation.”). 
 342 See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL 
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 14 (1995) (analyzing the justifications for 
incapacitation and explaining its appeal as partly that “restraint from future crime operates as 
a concrete justification for imprisonment . . . .”); Shawn D. Bushway, Evaluating 
Realignment: What Do We Learn About the Impact of Incarceration on Crime?, 15 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 309, 313 (2016) (in analyzing data on the impact of California’s 
reduction of its prison population, disagreeing that studies showed “that incapacitation as a 
strategy is fundamentally flawed”). 
 343 See, e.g., PEW, USE OF ELECTRONIC OFFENDER-TRACKING DEVICES EXPANDS SHARPLY 
3 (2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2016/09/use-of-
electronic-offender-tracking-devices-expands-sharply [https://perma.cc/M3SS-ZLGV] 
(“Nationally, nearly 7 million people were in prison or jail or on probation or parole at the end 
of 2014, but individuals tracked using electronic devices in 2015 represented less than 2 
percent of that total.”). 
 344 Longer-term incapacitation is, admittedly, harder to achieve for cyber-criminals as 
they could access sensitive information remotely in addition to actually inserting a USB flash 
drive into a computer or other technique that requires physical proximity. 
 345 U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 145. 
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that imprisoning him was needed to stop him from committing further thefts. 
And, as a PRC national, he was scheduled to be removed from the United 
States after completing his sentence.346 He will thus be incapacitated from 
physical activities within the United States. Aside from any valuable 
information that he has stored in his brain, he will not be of use to actors in 
the PRC who might want to engage in intellectual-property theft in the future. 
Similarly, incapacitation is not a compelling justification for the China 
Initiative when viewed on the level of the PRC party-state. Of course, the 
United States cannot incapacitate “China” in the sense of putting this 
construct behind bars, but it can try to contain the PRC in various ways. The 
United States can go beyond deterring interactions between U.S.-based and 
PRC-based entities to actually disallowing those interactions. For example, 
the U.S. government can place certain PRC universities and individuals on 
the “Denied Person List” or “Entity List,” which would drastically curtail 
and even entirely cut off interactions.347 
Discussions regarding “decoupling” various facets of the U.S.–PRC 
relationship also move toward incapacitation.348 Congressional action is 
necessary to change laws that lean toward decoupling. For example, 
regulations became effective in February 2020 implementing the Foreign 
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), which 
“strengthens and modernizes [the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States, CFIUS] to address national security concerns more 
effectively . . . .”349 While it cannot enact laws or investment regulations, the 
DOJ can play a critical role in supporting efforts to limit activities with PRC-
linked entities. The China Initiative Fact Sheet includes implementing 
FIRRMA as a component,350 and, in April 2019, the Deputy Attorney 
General of the National Security Division’s remarks at a conference on 
CFIUS began by referencing the China Initiative, emphasizing the need to 
“broaden our approach,” and recognizing that “criminal prosecution alone is 
 
 346 HVISTENDAHL, supra note 191, at 255 (“In January 2019, Robert wrote me that his 
sentence was almost completed and he would soon be deported.”). 
 347 Ku, supra note 309. 
 348 See Lindsey W. Ford, Refocusing the China Debate: American Allies and the Question 
of U.S.-China “Decoupling”, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.brookings.
edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/02/07/refocusing-the-china-debate-american-allies-and-the-
question-of-us-china-decoupling/ [https://perma.cc/UF8C-L3WF]. 
 349 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-
investment-in-the-united-states-cfius [https://perma.cc/QH72-96HW]. 
 350 CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 1. 
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not enough to remediate the harm caused by theft or to deter future 
thieves.”351 
Just as with overdeterrence, the current discussions surrounding the 
China Initiative would benefit from wrestling with the potential for over-
incapacitation. Greater outside expertise is crucial in finding the balance 
between protecting sensitive technologies while still welcoming productive 
investment. The Rhodium Group has advised, “[i]t is therefore in the interest 
of the United States to better understand the nature of these inflows [from the 
PRC] and how to interpret them, in order to secure the benefits while 
continuing to manage any traditional or new forms of potential associated 
risk.”352 
Over-incapacitation further risks cutting off channels of communication 
between the United States and PRC that can provide valuable information. In 
advising Congress that the United States should work with the PRC on setting 
artificial-intelligence standards, Samm Sacks explained in March 2020, 
“[t]here is a national security risk if we do decouple with China and lose 
visibility into the way they are thinking about these issues.”353 In the realm 
of legal issues, the U.S.-China Legal Experts Dialogue was last held in 
2015,354 and the Trump administration’s intended annual U.S.-China Law 
Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue was held only once in 2017.355 
These dialogues give a mere limited window into the PRC leadership’s 
thinking, and the PRC-side is also responsible for their demise, but combined 
with informal channels they can provide at least a more textured 
understanding of the other side. In contrast, when walls are built, risks 
increase that the China Initiative will be based on conjecture about the 
thinking in Beijing rather than concrete information. 
 
 351 U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 196. 
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(Oct. 14, 2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/10/248211.htm [https://perma
.cc/4TG9-LZQJ]. 
 355 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., First U.S.-China Law Enforcement and 
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C. REHABILITATION 
Rehabilitation is another forward-looking goal of punishment: the 
criminal can be made to no longer pose a threat to society and, perhaps, even 
to live a “flourishing and successful” life.356 Academics and policymakers 
have long debated the efficacy of rehabilitative efforts.357 On the individual 
level in the China Initiative, the standard rehabilitative programs such as 
mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, and “[e]ncouraging 
inmates to develop marketable job skills”358 do not seem particularly 
applicable to typical defendants. A scientist or professor is not in need of 
education programs, and a PRC national who will be removed upon release 
has no need to be equipped “with information and resources as they return to 
the community.”359 Nor are there rehabilitative programs that are tailored to 
working with people convicted under the umbrella of the China Initiative. 
Where the calculation is more interesting is whether China can be 
rehabilitated. John Demers said at the Initiative’s launch that the DOJ “will 
confront China’s malign behaviors and encourage them to conduct 
themselves as they aspire to be: one of the world’s leading nations.”360 And 
one of the Initiative’s goals is to “work to improve Chinese responses to our 
requests for assistance in criminal investigations and prosecutions under the 
Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement . . . .” 361 That the China Initiative might 
inspire China to greater respect of intellectual property protection through 
positive encouragement is not reflected in the Initiative’s implementation to 
date. Instead, the thrust is deterrence through punishment. 
Past attempts with the current PRC leadership do not bode well that a 
more cooperative approach would yield the desired change in behavior.362 
 
 356 MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 234 (1984) (though critiquing the latter 
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 357 See, e.g., Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional 
Rehabilitation: A Review of Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 297, 315 (2007). 
 358 Prison Reform: Reducing Recidivism By Strengthening the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/archives/prison-reform 
[https://perma.cc/7FQN-254G]. 
 359 Id. 
 360 CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET, supra note 1; see also Statement of Demers, supra note 
12, at 2 (“China is instead pursuing its goals through malign behaviors that exploit features 
of . . . an open society like ours.”). 
 361 Statement of Demers, supra note 12, at 8. 
 362 See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the 
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The U.S.–PRC relationship is likely going to be contentious in the near future 
even with the most adept handling in Washington, D.C. The Trump 
administration’s increasingly hard line toward the PRC, as seen in the sudden 
closure of a PRC consulate,363 indicated by the end of President Trump’s 
term that the stated cooperative aims of the China Initiative had faded from 
view. 
Despite the current dark times for U.S–PRC relations, the China 
Initiative would benefit from greater consideration of how the strong rhetoric 
and enforcement actions today could present challenges to rehabilitating the 
U.S.–PRC relationship should a window of opportunity open in the future. 
This does not mean that the U.S. government should be soft on the PRC 
leadership. It does mean that the U.S. government should compete in a 
vigorous and principled manner. It is far easier to label something a threat 
than to remove existing stigma. Describing the China Initiative as a response 
to a “long-term existential threat”364 locks the United States into a position 
of confrontation with the PRC, rather than exploring how the relationship 
might be one of more carefully calibrated rivalry or competition. 
The stark us-versus-them framing of the China Initiative further raises 
the concern of who will be there to rehabilitate the relationship should the 
opportunity arise. In 2009, President Obama announced the “100,000 
Strong” initiative to increase the number of Americans studying in China,365 
which was followed by the 2015 “1 Million Strong” initiative that aimed to 
bring the total number of students learning Mandarin Chinese in the United 
States to one million by 2020.366 Yet a downturn in foreign language and 
regional studies learning that was already apparent during the Obama years 
continued under President Trump.367 Furthermore, in January 2020, the 
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Peace Corps announced plans to end its China program.368 This was followed 
by an announcement in July 2020 that the U.S. government would end the 
Fulbright exchange program with both mainland China and Hong Kong.369 
The decreased emphasis on studying the PRC and the Chinese language is 
particularly troubling when coupled with concerns of acquired China-ness. 
Rosie Levine, a graduate of Yenching Academy, Peking University, reflected 
on the FBI’s interest in her classmates: 
When balancing the risk of not obtaining a security clearance against the “safer” option 
of learning about China from a textbook, [future China specialists] may decide that the 
cost of studying abroad is too high. The chilling effect that FBI questioning has on 
young scholars risks alienating a cohort of American citizens best equipped to see our 
country through these increasingly challenging times.370 
D. RETRIBUTION 
Deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation all aim to bring about 
beneficial consequences for society.371 The China Initiative is problematic 
when assessed in terms of whether the United States ultimately comes out 
ahead by using that framing. Retribution turns our perspective backward and 
rests the justification for punishment on whether the offender deserves it.372 
For individuals sentenced in cases under the China Initiative, that there 
is a foreign aspect to the crime can be relevant if the offense for which they 
were convicted is traditional or economic espionage. This foreign element 
enhances the blameworthiness, though, as with retributive theory more 
generally, it is unclear to what extent Congress made that determination 
based on increased harm versus moral culpability: “Two basic elements 
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determine an offender’s degree of blameworthiness: the nature and 
seriousness of the harm caused or threatened by the crime and the offender’s 
degree of culpability in committing the crime.”373 
None of the crimes charged under the China Initiative have China 
explicitly stated in the statute, nor does the fact that the foreign government 
is the PRC factor into the sentencing guidelines for economic espionage.374 
Yet a 2018 study of economic espionage cases from 1997 to 2015 found that 
“Chinese and Asian defendants convicted of espionage crimes received 
sentences over twice as long, on average, as defendants with Western names 
convicted of espionage crimes.”375 Questions deserving further study include 
(1) has this sentencing discrepancy persisted since 2015 and (2) if so, what 
are the possible explanations for the discrepancy aside from the ethnicity and 
race of the defendant. 
If there is a discrepancy and it cannot be explained by nationality- and 
ethnicity-neutral reasons (e.g., the cases with higher sentences involved 
thefts of larger value), then what is it about the person’s ethnicity or race that 
is prompting a higher sentence? It could be that implicit bias is in play,376 or 
that the defendants are seen as more blameworthy, or that the goal of 
deterrence is seen as better achieved through these cases. If the China 
Initiative’s emphasis on general deterrence is resulting in longer sentences 
for ethnically Chinese defendants, then retribution might actually serve as a 
limiting factor by cautioning that these defendants are being punished beyond 
what is morally justified.377 In other words, retribution could “tame the utility 
monster”378 of using defendants in the China Initiative as vehicles to warn 
the public of the consequences should they engage in similar conduct.379 
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However, if part of the blameworthiness of people convicted as part of the 
China Initiative is “China” and not just the intellectual-property theft or false 
statements or whatever the specific illicit conduct might be, then we are back 
to all of the concerns expressed in Part III: China is being criminalized. 
Beyond the retributive calculations on the level of individual 
defendants, the rhetoric around the China Initiative also speaks of “China’s 
maligned behaviors.”380 More generally, the U.S. government is seen as 
“punishing” China as part of the trade dispute.381 How is blameworthiness 
measured for the PRC party-state? The more practical concern is that China 
cannot be punished through the U.S. criminal justice system. It is one thing 
to “punish” the PRC party-state via tariffs or sanctions,382 but the subjects of 
criminal punishment are individuals. The more that the bad acts of the PRC 
party-state are attributed to individual defendants, the more necessary it is to 
pause and ask whether association with “China” is in part what is driving the 
punishment. If a person is an accomplice of a bank robber, that accomplice’s 
punishment is not enhanced because the bank robber from which accomplice 
liability flows is a serial bank robber. 
It bears repeating that there is strong evidence that the PRC party-state 
is directing and incentivizing at least some criminal activities. There is a 
threat. In addition, the PRC party-state has demonstrated its own use of 
retribution—or, more bluntly, retaliation—for acts of which the leadership 
disapproves. At the time of writing, Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael 
Spavor had been detained in the PRC for over two years.383 The allegations 
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against them remain unclear, but it is widely seen—at least outside the 
PRC—that the detentions were at least in part retaliation for Canada’s 
detention of Huawei CFO, Meng Wanzhou.384 The PRC party-state has also 
been known to retaliate against foreign companies that complain about their 
treatment in the PRC or who cooperate with the U.S. government.385 
What the DOJ can and should do is steadfastly pursue a principled path 
and craft a response to the actions of the PRC party-state without enveloping 
a broader conception of China into that threat. The December 2019 report by 
the JASON group is instructive. The Report provides nine 
recommendations—all written in country-neutral language—that provide 
increased safeguards and greater emphasis on collaborative responses to 
threats, as well as broader supportive measures like expanding, “[e]ducation 
and training in scientific ethics.”386 It notes that, “[l]ike any émigrés, [U.S. 
citizens originally from the PRC] must be treated as fellow residents or 
citizens of our country and should be judged on their personal actions and 
not by profiling based on the actions of the government and political 
institutions of their home country.”387 
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E. AN INITIATIVE BY ANY OTHER NAME 
Discarding the China Initiative in favor of an initiative with a country-
neutral name like the “Espionage Initiative” or “Intellectual Property 
Protection Initiative” may seem cosmetic. At worst a “China” initiative might 
persist sub rosa within the DOJ and not be subject to the sunlight of external 
appraisals.388 An initiative by another name might smell as unsweet.389 
Prosecutors have tremendous discretion that is often shielded from outside 
scrutiny,390 and removing the “China” label does not guarantee a change in 
how the DOJ views persons possessing China-ness. Yet names do matter.391 
In the different context of why using the language of human rights matters, 
Philip Alston explained, “human rights language does matter. It provides a 
context and a detailed and balanced framework, . . . it brings into the 
discussion the carefully negotiated elaborations of the meaning of specific 
rights that have emerged from decades of reflection, discussion, and 
adjudication.”392 
At issue with the China Initiative is not the absence of language but 
rather the presence of language: the words that the DOJ chooses to describe 
its work bring to the forefront what the U.S. government has decided is 
salient in identifying and combatting criminal threats. The broad conception 
of “China” cannot be ameliorated by statements that the real concern is the 
Chinese government, Chinese Communist Party, or both coupled with 
assurances that the United States still welcomes people with ties to the 
PRC.393 
Admittedly, there is no easy way to respond to well-established 
concerns that the PRC party-state is connected to violations of U.S. criminal 
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laws. But there is a better way. The term “smart on crime” is popular.394 Part 
of being smart on using criminal law to protect economic and national 
security is to enhance communication with the scientists, engineers, and 
educators who are creating valuable technologies. U.S. Attorney Andrew 
Lelling, for instance, has recognized that the DOJ needs to learn more about 
how the science works: “The investigators involved have to build their own 
expertise in the underlying activity. And I think you see that here.”395 In 
September 2019, dozens of leading organizations representing the scientific 
community wrote to the U.S. government welcoming greater collaboration 
and expressing that “[o]ur organizations and members are witnessing an 
escalating concern among U.S. and international scientists that new policies 
and procedures under consideration to minimize security risks will have the 
unintended effect of harming the scientific enterprise.”396 Kevin 
Droegemeier, then-Director of the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP), responded promptly and positively by outlining 
work underway to coordinate work across agencies under the umbrella of the 
Joint Committee on the Research Environment (JCORE).397 Director 
Droegemeier also spoke at the October 2019 FBI Academia Summit.398 
In discussing the work of JCORE’s Subcommittee on Research Security 
as part of his congressional testimony in February 2020, Director 
Droegemeier both noted thefts and surreptitious influence by the PRC 
government and also affirmed that, “[t]o maintain our global leadership, 
America must balance protecting its research enterprise while promoting the 
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openness that has been and will continue to be critical to our success.”399 This 
testimony followed remarks in January 2020 on the “systemic threat” from 
the PRC government: “We live in a world very different today than we did 
even 10 years ago, so we want to have the proper amount of vigilance and 
oversight.”400 Whether in the Biden administration OSTP and JCORE can 
cement a role in balancing concerns of law enforcement and the scientific 
and academic communities is uncertain, but collaboration is one possible 
path to decrease reliance on deterrence through the criminal law. 
Increased collaboration between the government and the communities 
that create valuable science and technology is necessary but not sufficient. 
The DOJ also needs to be “smart on China” by increasing cultural 
competency, linguistic ability,401 and knowledge of substantive areas that are 
critical to the U.S.–PRC relationship. Even work on how to more accurately 
pronounce the Pinyin Romanization system can demonstrate respect for 
people with Chinese names. The DOJ can take a step toward this goal by 
strengthening channels for meaningful, sustained conversations between the 
government and nongovernmental experts. This requires forging ties with 
precisely those people being stigmatized by the China Initiative. The DOJ 
has expressed its desire to do this work and has taken initial steps:402 “Done 
well, our China Initiative will not only improve the way law enforcement 
responds to China’s economic aggression, but also will raise our country’s 
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awareness of the threats and how we as a people can work to protect 
ourselves and our assets from them.”403 
The DOJ is stressing the need for the private sector to work with law 
enforcement when intellectual property has been compromised.404 And 
academia is becoming more sensitized of the need to assess and adjust their 
policies and procedures regarding reporting of foreign contacts.405 But for 
true collaboration, the DOJ needs to shift from messaging what it views as 
the threats to more substantive, bi-directional collaboration with 
nongovernmental experts.406 To do this right will take time. What the DOJ 
has in its power to do immediately is to drop “China” from the name of the 
initiative and instead focus on individual cases free from an overarching 
specter of a China threat. 
CONCLUSION 
While Congress has not actually written “China” into the criminal 
statutes themselves, the DOJ has criminalized “China” by pursuing it as an 
explicit enforcement priority.407 This is problematic because it stigmatizes 
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natural and legal persons who are seen as possessing a shared characteristic 
of China-ness. This threat-by-association lumps together a broad array of 
people and entities as connected within an encompassing “China” web. An 
expansive conception of China takes on an anthropomorphic form of a 
perpetrator. 
The China Initiative is further problematic when assessed against the 
standard yardsticks for the DOJ’s decisions to prosecute and, ultimately, for 
convicted individuals to be punished. The overwhelming emphasis on 
national security is impeding the ability to engage in a clear-eyed assessment 
of the costs that come with the China Initiative. The Initiative has been 
gaining speed, but the DOJ should instead tap the breaks and reassess the 
reasons for and wisdom of this construct. 
Yangyang Cheng, a particle physicist who was born in the PRC but is a 
researcher in the United States, reflected: “I have three important sheets of 
paper as the world sees it: my Chinese passport, my U.S. visa, and my Ph.D. 
diploma. It is somewhat ironic, that with the tenuous relationships I have with 
both my birth country and my adopted home, as well as the directions both 
governments are headed, my diploma is the paper I am least likely to lose.”408 
If the DOJ pauses and rethinks the direction that it is headed, the United 
States will be less likely to lose talent like Dr. Cheng. 
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